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Abstract
This thesis addresses three issues in the fields of macroeconomics and international finance.
The first chapter examines how institutional investors, such as mutual funds and hedge funds,
tend to transmit economic and financial shocks across borders. Using a novel micro-level dataset
on portfolio investments from a vast number of funds located in advanced markets, I find strong
evidence of contagion propagating through the fund industry. Changes in economic and financial
conditions in advanced markets generate global waves of portfolio inflows (outflows) with a massive
impact on emerging markets’ funding. I illustrate this finding by deriving contagion maps showing
where contagion spreads and with what intensity. I also find that countries that are politically
unstable and that are remote from the main financial centers are the main victims of such conta-
gion. Overall, the results clearly suggest that push eﬀects from advanced market investors aﬀect
developing countries and expose them to sudden stops and surges.
The second chapter, co-authored with Shekhar Aiyar, Romain Duval, Longmei Zhang and Yiqun
Wu, investigates the existence, and potential determinants, of the so-called “middle income trap”,
defined as the phenomenon of rapidly growing economies stagnating at middle-income levels and
failing to graduate into the ranks of high income countries. We examine the middle-income trap
as a special case of growth slowdowns and identify slowdowns as large sudden and sustained de-
viations from the growth path predicted by a basic conditional convergence framework. We then
examine their determinants by means of probit regressions, looking into the role of institutions, de-
mography, infrastructure, the macroeconomic environment, output structure and trade structure.
Two variants of Bayesian Model Averaging are used as robustness checks. The results—including
some that speak to the special status of middle-income countries—are then used to derive policy
implications.
The third chapter, co-authored with David Pothier, proposes a theory explaining the cyclical
properties of the income distribution. We develop a two sector general equilibrium model in which
agents have non-homothetic preferences and diﬀer in terms of their initial ownership of capital.
We show that when sectors diﬀer in terms of their relative labour- and capital-intensity, changes in
the composition of aggregate demand is an important channel through which productivity shocks
are propagated through the economy. We then use this framework to study the distributional con-
sequences of business-cycle shocks. Consistent with empirical evidence, we find income inequality
(as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient) to be counter-cyclical and this eﬀect to be driven mostly by
changes in the level of employment and, to a lesser degree, by changes in relative factor prices.
Interestingly, we also find that changes in the concentration of capital ownership have negligible
eﬀects on both the level and the cyclical properties of income inequality.
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“Genuineness only thrives in the dark. Like celery.” A. H.
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Chapter 1 - Institutional Investors Flows and the Geography
of Contagion∗
Damien PUY
First version: February 2013. This version: May 2014
Abstract
This paper explores the geography of portfolio investments emanating from insti-
tutional investors based in mature markets using a novel dataset of high frequency
portfolio flows. We identify precise global and regional dynamics in equity and bond
flows. Very few countries receive (or lose) funding in isolation. We also find strong
evidence of global contagion: although global waves originate in developed markets,
emerging markets’ funding is much more affected. We illustrate this finding by de-
riving contagion maps showing where contagion spreads and with what intensity. In
general, our results suggest that push effects from advanced market investors affect
massively developing countries and expose them to sudden stops and surges. [JEL F32,
F36, G11, G15, G23]
1 Introduction
Do institutional investors propagate shocks? and if yes, to whom? Over the last decade, a growing
literature has documented the ability of financial intermediaries to propagate shocks across borders,
even in the absence of common fundamentals. Along with banks, the fund industry has attracted
particular attention and is now recognized as an important vehicle of financial contagion1. To
date, a number of empirical contributions have found compelling evidence of “contagious” portfolio
∗damien.puy@eui.eu. I would like to thank Massimiliano Marcellino, Evi Pappa, Fabio Canova, Ayhan Kose,
Fabrizio Perri, Menzie Chinn, Romain Duval, Massimiliano Caporin, Gaston Gelos, Aitor Erce and Horacio Sapriza
for their helpful comments, as well as all all participants in the CEPR-EABCN-Banque de France conference
on “Global Spillovers and Economic Cycles”, Bank of Italy-Cide workshop on Empirical Economics, ECB-EMG
conference on Emerging Market Finance, as well as participants in Job market presentations. I am also very
grateful to the Asia Pacific Department of the IMF and Banque de France for access to the dataset.
1For a discussion, see Gelos (2011).
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rebalancing at the fund level, with adverse consequences for countries within the same portfolio.2
Yet, little is known about the geography of contagion. Where does contagion actually spread? So
far, the existing literature has little to say about this issue. Recent research based on fund level data
is usually restricted to a small set of investors, which makes it uneasy to derive general conclusions
about contagion patterns.3 In addition, most studies tend to focus on developing countries during
crisis periods, leaving the impression that adverse phenomena, such as sudden stops, surges or
spillovers, are restricted to emerging markets in times of high financial stress. However, recent
evidence has also pointed to fire sales (or purchases) from funds propagating shocks across mature
markets, suggesting that such phenomena are in fact more general.4 As a result, some important
questions remain to be explored: How do “micro” patterns, such as contagious portfolio rebalancing
or fire sales/purchases, translate at the macro level? Second, who is affected? Can we identify
contagion patterns, or typical “spillovers” areas? Finally, what are the countries that are most
sensitive to contagion?
This paper addresses these questions in three steps. As a starting point, we build on Jotikasthira,
Lundblad and Ramadorai (2012) and use a novel dataset of weekly portfolio flows emanating from
a vast number of equity and bond funds between 2001 and 2011. In contrast with them however,
we do not restrict our attention to global funds and use the full dataset (including hedge funds,
ETFs and regional funds), thereby increasing significantly the industry and country coverage. As
of 2011, the dataset was collecting information from more than 25,000 equity funds and 15,000
bond funds representing $15 trillion of assets invested in over 80 mature and emerging markets.
When compared to CPIS data on year-end foreign portfolio investment holdings (equity and debt
securities) at the country level, we find that these funds account altogether for, on average, 25% of
total foreign portfolio investments. Second, to capture the complex dynamics of fund flows at the
global level, we rely on large factor analysis and decompose the panels of bond and equity flows into
world, regional and idiosyncratic components using a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model in the
spirit of Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003). Coupled with an extensive dataset, this parametric
decomposition allows us to identify the existence of both global or regional spillovers, as well as to
derive a measure of sensitivity to different types spillovers (global or regional) for each country in
our sample. Once on a map, such measures also generate an intuitive “contagion map” illustrating
where contagion spreads and with what intensity. Finally, we build on these measures and inves-
tigate what determines, at the country level, such sensitivity to contagion. Building on different
strands of literature, we consider a vast set of variables, ranging from typical macro variables (in-
2See in particular Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004), Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006), Boyer, Kumagai
and Yuan (2006), Coval and Stafford (2007), Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai (2012), Raddatz and Schmukler
(2012).
3Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004) study a sample of 13 Latin American funds, whereas Broner, Gelos,
and Reinhart (2006) use data from 117 emerging market funds over 4 years.
4Hau and Lai (2012) and Manconi, Massa and Yasuda (2012) both highlighted the role of equity and bond funds
in propagating the great financial crisis.
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stitutions quality, fiscal balance, sound money...) to corporate measures of transparency, and run
a horse race between competing variables using two Bayesian averaging algorithms, namely the
WALS methodology from Magnus, Powell and Prufer (2010) and the standard BMA popularized
by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhoffer and Miller (2004).
Our main findings are the following. First, although the dataset aggregates flows from a vast
number of funds, the model identifies very precise world and regional dynamics in equity and
bond flows, with a substantial impact on all countries in our sample, including advanced markets.
According to the variance decompositions, only a handful of countries happen to receive/lose
funding in isolation. Second, we find strong evidence of both (i) regional contagion in bond flows
and (ii) global contagion in both equity and bond flows. In the case of regional contagion, the
model highlights the presence of a region grouping “all emerging markets”, implying that emerging
markets have a tendency to receive (or lose) funding at the same time, irrespective of their actual
location or macroeconomic environment. This, in turn, is consistent with emerging market bonds
being an asset class per se, in which investors herd when in search for yield, or retrench from when
conditions deteriorate. In the case of global contagion, we find that, for both equity and bond flows,
the global factor is driven by economic news and financial stress conditions in developed countries,
with periods of high (low) financial stress and poor (good) macroeconomic outlooks in advanced
markets being associated with equity and bond outflows (inflows) at the world level. However,
although these global waves originate in developed countries, emerging markets’ funding is much
more affected than mature markets’. In the case of equity flows, we find that 75% of the variability
of emerging markets funding is driven by these push factors originating in the domicile of funds.
Using “contagion maps” illustrates this finding nicely: we find that “core” advanced countries are
not substantially affected by the global push factors whereas almost all emerging markets at the
“periphery” display very high sensitivity levels, both in relative and absolute terms. Third and
finally, after investigating formally the determinants of such sensitivity to global contagion, we
find that the level of political risk, as well as the distance between the location of the fund and
the recipient country, are the best predictor of contagion sensitivity. In other words, when facing
a shock at home, investors tend to cut (or increase) their exposure to risky countries to a greater
extent. Our results suggest that distance and political risk act as the main “risk criteria” in the
eyes of investors and managers, thereby exposing fragile emerging countries to sudden stops (or
surges).
Taken together, our results are well connected to three different strands of the literature. First, we
contribute to the empirical literature on international mutual funds. To date, most contributions
had focused on finding evidence of destabilizing behaviours at the fund level, rather than on
identifying how such behaviours might affect countries’ external funding.5 Our results complement
5This includes overreaction (Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004), Borensztein and Gelos (2003)), momentum
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these studies by showing that portfolio rebalancing from funds at the micro-level translate, in
aggregate, into massive global and regional co-movement in portfolio investments. Interestingly,
we also find that extending the coverage in several dimensions (industry, time, space) does not
necessarily invalidate the conclusions of studies based on micro level data. To the contrary, some
findings, in particular from Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) and Jotikasthira et al (2012), seem
to be at play. Using data on global funds, Jotikasthira et al (2012) found that funding shocks
originating at “home”, i.e where funds are domiciled, translate into fire sales (and purchases)
in countries within the same portfolio, in particular emerging markets. Similarly, Raddatz and
Schmukler (2012) found that when country returns change or crises strike, both investors and
managers respond by adjusting their investments in the whole portfolio, thereby transmitting
shocks across countries. Moreover, their behavior tends to be pro-cyclical, reducing their exposure
to all countries during bad times and increasing it when conditions improve. The high procyclicality
of fund flows at the world level and the strength of global contagion in developing countries we
observe in our sample strongly support such a transmission channel. To our knowledge, we are the
first to map and quantify the impact of these portfolio rebalancing at the world level.
Second, the significance of political risk and geographic distance in scaling the sensitivity to global
contagion relates to a number of studies coming both from empirical finance and international
macroeconomics. Until now, both strands had highlighted different variables to explain capital
flows volatility.6 Although we are unable to compare these studies directly, the horse race between
all variables tend to reconcile both strands of literature. Better institutions, in form a stable politi-
cal environment, as well as lower information asymmetry, as captured by geographic distance, both
seem to reduce the sensitivity of countries to sudden stops (or surges) from international investors.
On the other hand, the significance of distance against other measures of transparency suggests
that soft measures of information asymmetry might play a stronger role than hard measures of
transparency at the level of fund managers.
Third, our results have important implications for the so-called “push-vs-pull” factor debate.7 Using
variance decompositions, we find although (global) push factors initiate global waves of portfolio
investments, structural “pull” factors (such as political stability or distance) determine the direction
trading (Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001)), herding (Wermers (1999),
Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999), Kim and Wei (2002), Hsieh et al. (2011)), fire sales (Coval and Stafford (2007),
Jotikasthira et al. (2012)) or “contagious” portfolio rebalancing (Broner et al. (2006), Jotikasthira et al. (2012),
Raddatz and Schmukler (2012)).
6Broner and Rigobon (2005) showed that better institutions can help reducing capital flow volatility. Using fund
level data, Gelos and Wei (2005) reported that during crises, funds tend to flow more from less transparent countries
and that herding is more pronounced in less transparent markets. Ferreira and Matos (2008) also emphasized the
importance of corporate transparency, showing that institutional investors reveal a preference for stocks of countries
with strong disclosure standards.
7For early contributions on this debate see Calvo et al (1993, 1996), Chuhan et al (1998), Fernandez-Arias
(1998), Kim (2000), Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2004). See Forbes and Warnock (2012) for a thorough review and
additional references.
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and magnitude of these flows. This finding is well connected to other empirical contributions that
have emphasized the importance of mature market conditions - such as interest rates, liquidity,
risk levels or weak economic performance - in generating capital movements.8 Recently, Ghosh
et al. (2012) also found that when surges in capital flows to EMEs occur, domestic pull factors
affect the exact magnitude of the inflow across countries. On the other hand, our findings seriously
downplay the relevance of short-term pull factors, such as purely domestic growth/productivity
shocks, in driving flows and appear more in line with recent case studies that found “little or no
role for domestic macroeconomic conditions”.9
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and important
stylized facts. Section 3 details the econometric framework and results. Section 4 discusses our
key findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Dataset and Stylized facts
2.1 EPFR Portfolio flows dataset
The portfolio investment dataset used in this paper is provided by the EPFR global, a private
company tracking the performance and asset allocation of a vast number of equity and debt funds
domiciled in developed countries and important offshore financial centers.10 Since its creation
in 1996, the coverage of the EPFR global has increased significantly, reaching currently a wide
industry and geographic coverage. As of 2013, the EPFR global was collecting information from
more than 29,000 equity funds and 18,000 fixed-income funds representing US$20 trillion of assets
invested in over 80 mature and emerging markets.
To understand further the composition of EPFR funds and its evolution over time, Appendix A
provides an in-depth analysis of the EPFR database, distinguishing funds by (i) Type of Asset
(Equity, Bond, Balanced, Money Market or Alternative) (ii) Geographic focus (iii) Type of client
(Retail vs Institutional) (iv) Management Rule (Active vs Passive) and (v) Redemption and Val-
uation rules (Open vs Closed-End Funds, ETF vs Non-ETF). The most notable findings can be
summarized as follows. First, following the rise of the fund industry over the last 15 years, the
8Fratzscher (2012) found that during the GFC global shocks (key crisis events, changes to global liquidity and
risk measured by the VIX) had a large effect on capital flows during both the crisis and the recovery. Kim (2000)
found that capital movements in four developing countries (Mexico, Korea, Chile and Malaysia) was largely due to
external reasons such as decreases in the world interest rate and recession in industrial countries. See Forbes and
Warnock (2012) for further references on the importance of conditions in large economies in driving capital flows.
9See for instance Alper (2000) in the case of Turkey and Mexico, or Kim (2000) for Chile, Mexico, Korea and
Malaysia.
10As of 2007, 46% of funds in the EPFR sample were domiciled in the US, 27% in Luxembourg, 9% in the UK
and 4% in Ireland.
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sum of assets under management covered by EPFR increased tremendously, from US$ 1 trillion in
early 2003 to more than US$ 22 trillions in 2014. Second, equity funds have always represented
the biggest share of the total asset coverage, followed by bond funds and more recently by money
market funds. Third, in absolute terms, most of equity and bond funds investments have been
made (and are still made) in developped economies, such as North America, Western Europe and
developped Asia. However, in relative terms, Emerging Market funds turn out to be more repre-
sentative of the total external funding received at the country level: using Coordinated Portfolio
Investment Statistics (CPIS) data on year-end foreign portfolio investment holdings (equity and
debt securities) for 80 countries in 2011, and comparing them with the sum of assets covered by
EPFR (aggregating over all funds) in each of these countries, we find that in 2011, EPFR funds
accounted for, on average, more than 25% of total foreign portfolio investments at the country
level, and that the coverage is higher for equity investments and emerging markets. Fourth, al-
though most EPFR funds are mutual funds with a retail focus and open-end structures, we find
that ETFs and institutional funds have been increasingly represented in the EPFR sample over
the last 10 years. This trend is also partly reflected in the rise of funds categorized as “passively
managed”.
We now turn to the data used in this paper. As our purpose is to understand the evolution
of international funding at the country level, we follow Fratzscher (2012) and use only one data
category - “net country flows” - which is constructed as follows: for each period and for each fund,
EPFR collects the amount of cash flowing in and out of the fund, as well as the share allocated to
each country within the fund. Once aggregated across funds and sorted by recipient country, the
sum of these flows determines the “net country flow”, which provides the amount of capital lost
(or received) by the country over the reference period from the overall universe of funds tracked
by EPFR, net of injections/redemptions, portfolio performance and currency fluctuations. Figures
1 and 2 below report the monthly country flows computed by the EPFR, distinguishing between
equity and bond flows. Equity flows are available from 1996 to 2011 whereas bond flows are
reported only from 2003 onwards. For simplicity, both types of flows are presented at the regional
level. Moreover, net country flows are adjusted by the total level of Asset Under Management
(AUM), which reports the stock of assets invested in the recipient country at the beginning of the
month. Hence, a drop of 3% in country i at month t implies that country i “lost” 3% of the total
funding that was invested at the end of the previous month, in t− 1. The level of AUM acts as an
important scale variable that allows to interpret the magnitude of the inflow/outflow as well as to
control for changes in the sample of the funds covered.11
11Inflows (or outflows) are always reported in dollars, which can be hard to interpret. Once normalized by the
size of holdings previously invested in the country, the flow variable (now expressed in % of AUM) indicates whether
the country lost most (or only a small portion) of its external funding over a given period. In addition, because
EPFR gradually expanded its coverage to include more funds over time. Using the lagged level of assets invested
allows us to control for this upward trend in the sample size. Therefore, in the remainder of the article and except
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Figure 1: Equity Flows 1996 - 2011
















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Before exploring further the geography of international portfolio flows, we emphasize the key
strengths of the EPFR global dataset, in particular compared to other financial flows sources.
First, flows are reported at a high frequency, which allows to better monitor investors and managers
response to economic shocks.12 Second, the EPFR global offers a wide industry and geographic
coverage which goes a long way in addressing some of the shortcomings of the existing literature.
On the one hand, using a vast range of investors offers a better assessment of institutional investors’
impact at the global level. To date, evidence of destabilizing behaviour from international investors
tended to be restricted to small samples of funds, making it impossible to assess the consequences
of these micro-behaviours for international capital flows patterns.13 On the other hand, the vast
country and time coverage permits the identification of co-movement in flows (i) at the world level
and (ii) during tranquil periods. To our knowledge, most empirical studies have focused on subsets
of the world and/or crisis events, leaving the impression that funds behaviour affect exclusively
emerging markets during episodes of high financial stress.14 An important finding of this paper will
be to show that co-movement in flows is a more general phenomenon, which also takes place among
advanced markets and in normal times. Third and finally, the EPFR dataset has been found to be
a reliable data source. Comparing TNAs (Total Net Assets) and monthly returns of a subsample
of EPFR funds to CRSP mutual fund data, Jotikasthira et al. (2012) found only minor differences
between EPFR and CRSP datasets. In addition, although EPFR only captures a subset of (gross)
portfolio inflows, Miao and Pant (2012) showed that EPFR fund flows correlate well with BoP
recorded capital flows into emerging markets, thereby suggesting that EPFR flows act as a timely
and accurate proxy for overall portfolio inflows to emerging markets.15 As a result, the EPFR
global dataset has been used in recent seminal contributions on shock progagation through funds,
in particular in the “country flows” format used in this paper.16
when explicitly specified, inflows and outflows are always adjusted (%AUM).
12Traditional BOP data are available only at a quarterly frequency, whereas the Coordinated Portfolio Investment
Survey provide only year-end data on portfolio investment holdings. Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005) and Hau and
Rey (2008) use data on mutual fund holdings from Thomson Financial securities that are limited to semi-annual
observations. Such frequencies are better suited for “stock” analysis, such as home bias, than flow analysis.
13Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2004) study a sample of 13 Latin American funds whereas Broner, Gelos, and
Reinhart (2006) use data from 117 emerging market funds over 4 years. Jotikasthira et al. (2012) consider a bigger
set of funds, but restrict attention only to global funds.
14Broner et al. (2006) study the behaviour of equity funds only during emerging market crisis. Boyer, Kumagai
and Yuan (2006) also find evidence of contagion contrasting the behavior of investable and non-investable indices
during crises. Kim and Wei (2002) compare foreign portfolio investements before and during a crisis.
15Other important sources of portfolio investments are not captured by EPFR, such as proprietary trading desks
of foreign brokers and investment banks, foreign insurance companies investing their excess cash, and wealthy
individuals and individual companies purchasing company stocks for strategic reasons or to invest excess cash. On
the other hand, emerging markets rely substantially on funds in developped market for external funding. As a
result, although EPFR funds represent a small portion of gross portfolio inflows in absolute terms, they might be
very representative of the behavior of their investor base as a whole. See Appendix A for an illustration of the
strong correlation between equity and bond flows in EPFR and BoP recorded gros inflows to Emerging Markets.
16See Raddatz and Schmukler (2012), Jotikasthira et al (2012), Fratzscher (2012) and references therein.
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2.2 Stylized facts: Cycles and Co-movement in Portfolio flows
Given the dimension of the dataset used in this paper, this section first summarizes the important
properties of international portfolio flows emanating from investors between 1996 and 2011. Two
features, in particular, are highlighted for both equity and bond flows: (i) the cyclical behaviour
of fund flows (ii) the strong degree of co-movement across countries. We provide more formal
evidence supporting these two stylized facts and discuss their implications for the geography of
international investors flows.
As a first step, we build on Bry and Boschan (1971) and apply the following filter to monthly
equity and bond flows at the country level:
• Step 1: Months of inflows/outflows are first identified using a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the flow is positive and -1 if the flow is negative. Formally, defining yi,t as the
flow of asset (% AUM) to country i in month t, we create the indicator variable Di,t defined
as:
Di,t = 1 if yi,t ≥ 0
Di,t = −1 if yi,t < 0
• Step 2:
– Periods of sustained inflows or outflows are respectively defined as a “Surge phase” or a
“Retrenchment phase” if they last at least 2 consecutive months;
– Alternatively, periods over which a month of inflows alternate with a month of outflow
qualify as “Undefined phase”
• Step 3: Finally, we define Si,t a “phase” variable taking value 1 if country i at time t experi-
enced a Surge phase, and 0 if it experienced a Retrenchment phase.
Using the variable Si,t, we first compute summary statistics about phases characteristics at the
regional level in tables 1 and 2. This includes the number of phases, the average duration of
phases (in months) and the average gain (or loss) over each phase (in % of AUM). To study
the co-movement properties of portfolio flows, we then compute a diffusion index as derived in
Harding and Pagan (2002, 2006). Formally, the diffusion index measures the share of countries, in
our sample, experiencing the same phase each month. For the case of retrenchments, the index is
computed as follows:
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Difft =
∑N
1 wi,tFi,t, where
∑N
1
wi,t = 1 and t = 1, ..., T
where wi,t is the weight assigned to i-th country at time t, Fi,t is a binary variable taking the value
1 if the i-th country experiences a retrenchment and 0 otherwise, and N is the cross-sectional
dimension. In what follows, we assume an equal weight of 1/N for all countries. The diffusion
index for Surges is simply one minus the diffusion index for Retrenchments. Figures 3 and 4 report
the diffusion index for both equity and bond datasets.
Table 1 highlights some important properties of equity flows between 1996 and 2011. First, the
algorithm identifies a strong cyclical pattern, with on average 18 phases identified for developed
regions and 25 phases for emerging regions, leaving only around 10% of the sample out of the
“phase” identification framework.17 Second, periods of “retrenchment” are significantly shorter,
suggesting that investors leave countries faster than they enter. Third, developed regions tend to
have fewer and more protracted phases than emerging markets. Fourth and finally, there is a stark
difference in the amplitude of the phases across regions.18 During surge phases, emerging regions
tend to gain more than twice as much funding than developed economies. However, they also tend
to lose twice as much during retrenchment phases. Taken together, these findings suggest that
emerging regions experience higher “volatility” insofar as they experience more phases of shorter
length and of greater amplitude. Looking at table 2, we find that most of the stylized facts
highlighted above also characterize bond flows. In particular, we still observe (i) a strong cyclical
pattern (ii) a sharp asymmetry in the duration of surge vs retrenchment phases, and (iii) a greater
amplitude of phases in the case of developing regions. It is important to note however that the
bond sample is significantly shorter than the one used for equity flows for some regional aggregates
are only available from 2005 onwards.19 More importantly, most of the sample covers the Global
Financial Crisis (henceforth GFC), implying that the stylized facts are not easy to generalize. In
fact, the behaviour of bond flows over these years might reflect more the peculiarity of the period
than any structural difference in the behaviour of this asset class.
Figures 3 and 4 highlight the other important finding, namely the co-movement of flows at the
country level. Note that by construction, a value close to 0 of the diffusion index indicates that
countries all tend to experience phases of surges, whereas a value close to 1 suggests that all coun-
tries experience a retrenchment phase. Most notably, the index often takes extreme values (close
to 1 or 0), implying that most of the sample moves in the same direction, i.e either receiving/losing
funding at the same time. This finding is true for both bond and equity flows. Not surprisingly, we
also find that most periods of retrenchment are associated with notable financial events. Figures
17More precisely, the number of months categorized as undefined accounts for only 10% of the sample for each
region. Results available on request.
18We refer to “amplitude” loosely to designate the cumulative loss or gain over a phase.
19Although some regional flows are reported from 2003 (see Figure 2), all seven regions are in fact reported
consistently only from 2005 onwards. Therefore, the stylized facts are computed using only data from 2005.
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        
        

         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         


  
Table 1: Summary Statistics - Regional Equity Cycles
        
        

         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         

  
Table 2: Summary Statistics - Regional Bond Cycles
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Figure 3: Cross Country Diffusion Index - Equity Flows
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Figure 4: Cross Country Diffusion Index - Bond Flows
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3 and 4 allow us to track the consequences of the major financial and economic shocks of the past
15 years on both equity and bond flows.
Taken together, these findings bring new evidence on the behaviour of international portfolio flows
emanating from the fund industry. We find that they (i) exhibit a strong cyclical behaviour and (ii)
they co-move substantially across countries. Moreover, emerging countries exhibit a high volatility
insofar as they experience cycles with more phases, of shorter length and of greater amplitude. At
the same time, they raise important questions as to the geography of fund flows. The strong level
of synchronization of flows, in particular, suggests the presence of global dynamics affecting some
(if not all) countries in our sample. To further explore the dynamics and geography of portfolio
investments, we build on large factor analysis and decompose bond and equity flows into world,
regional and country-specific components.
3 Econometric Model
In this section, we build on Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003) and estimate the following latent
factor model:
yi,t = β
w
i f
w
t + β
r
i f
r
j,t + εi,t (1)
where yi,t is the (demeaned) flow of funds (equity or bond) in country i at time t at a monthly
frequency, fwt is the (unobserved) world factor affecting all countries in our sample at time t, frj,t
is the (unobserved) regional factor affecting all countries belonging to region j at time t, and βwi
and βri designate country-specific factor loadings measuring the responses of country i to the world
and regional factors respectively. Finally, εi,t is an unobserved country-specific factor. Note also
that observations in the vector yi,t are measured as % of total AUM so that they report the loss
(or gain) over month t with respect to the level of asset invested in the country in month t− 1.
Because we allow factors to follow AR processes, the model in (1) is in fact a dynamic latent factor
model. More precisely, we assume that the idiosyncratic factors follow an AR(p) process:
εi,t = ρi,1εi,t−1 + ...+ ρi,pεi,t−p + ui,t (2)
where ui,t ∼ N(0, σ2i ) and E(ui,t, ui,t−s) = 0 for s 6= 0 and world and regional factors follow the
respective AR(q) processes:
fwt = ρ
w
1 f
w
t−1 + ...+ ρ
w
q f
w
t−q + u
w
t (3)
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frj,t = ρ
r
j,1f
r
j,t−1 + ...+ ρ
r
j,qf
r
j,t−q + u
r
j,t (4)
where uwt ∼ N(0, σ2w), urj,t ∼ N(0, σ2j,r), E(uwt , uwt−s) = E(urj,t, urj,t−s) = 0 for s 6= 0. Finally,
shocks in (2)-(4) are fully orthogonal to each other.
Because factors are unobservable, standard regression methods do not allow the estimation of the
model. As a consequence, we rely on Bayesian techniques with data augmentation as in Kose,
Otrok and Whiteman (2003) to perform the estimation. As a first step, we normalize the sign of
the factor/loadings by (i) restricting the loading on the world factor for the first country in our
sample to be positive and (ii) restricting the loadings on the regional factor for one country in
each region to be positive. Second, to normalize the scales, we assume that each of the factor
variances (σ2w and σ2j,r) is equal to 1. Note that these normalizations do not affect the qualitative
results and simply allow the identification of the model. In addition, we use Bayesian techniques
with data augmentation to estimate the parameters and factors in (1)-(4). This implies simulating
draws from complete posterior distribution for the model parameters and factors and successively
drawing from a series of conditional distributions using a MCMC procedure. Posterior distribution
properties for the model parameters and factors are based on 300.000 MCMC replications after
30.000 burn-in replications.
A key ingredient is the choice of the priors in the estimation. Once again we follow Kose, Otrok
and Whiteman (2003) and use the following conjugate priors:
(βwi , β
r
i )
′ ∼ N(0, I2) (5)
(ρi,1, ..., ρi,p)
′∼ N(0, diag(1, 0.5, ..., 0.5p−1)) (6)
(ρw1 , ..., ρ
w
q )
′∼ N(0, diag(1, 0.5, ..., 0.5q−1)) (7)
(ρrj,1, ..., ρ
r
j,q)
′∼ N(0, diag(1, 0.5, ..., 0.5q−1)) (8)
σ2i ∼ IG(6, 0.001) (9)
with i = 1, ..., N and IG denoting the inverse Gamma distribution, implying a rather diffuse prior
on the innovations variance. Finally, we assume that AR processes in (2)-(4) are stationary. In our
implementation, we set the length of both the idiosyncratic and factor auto-regressive polynomials
to 2. However, other (non-zero) values for p and q were tried with no substantial differences in the
results.
14
Before turning to the results, we mention that beside the estimation of the factors and loadings, we
are interested in measuring the influence of the different factors on each country’s level of interna-
tional portfolio funding. Therefore, we will pay particular attention to the variance decompositions
for each country in our sample. Given that factors are orthogonal to each other, we can compute
θwi :
θwi = (β
w
i )
2var(f tw)/var(yi,t) (10)
where var(yi,t) = (βwi )2var(f tw) + (βri )2var(frj,t) + var(εi,t)
where θwi reports the proportion of total variability in country’s i funding attributable to the world
factor. θri and θci are defined similarly and measure the share of variance captured by the regional
and country-specific factors, respectively. As we shall see, these variance decompositions provide
a natural measure of a country’s sensitivity to different types of dynamics.
3.1 Data and Regional Decomposition
Following Jotikasthira et al. (2012), we address potential data issues by rearranging the “raw”
country flows dataset in several standard ways. First, to avoid data errors, misreporting or out-
liers, country flows are considered only (i) for countries for which flows are consistently reported
throughout the sample period (ii) for countries experiencing a change in AUM over one month
strictly smaller than 50% in absolute value.20 Second, funds for which no geographic allocation
information is available, i.e. for which no sufficient information exists on the countries in which
assets are invested, are also excluded. After this standard data cleaning, the equity sample ranges
from 2001 until 2011 (121 months) and covers 58 countries for a total of 7018 observations. The
bond model ranges only from 2005 until 2011 (77 months) and covers 73 countries, for a total of
5621 observations.
As a benchmark, equity and bond models are estimated using seven regions, namely: (i) North
America (ii) Latin America (iii) Developed Europe (iv) Emerging Europe (v) Middle East and
Africa (vi) Developed Asia and (vii) Emerging Asia. Countries within each region are detailed
in Appendix A. It is important to note however that this regional decomposition is just one out
many possible regional decompositions. In particular, one might think of many other potential
classifications based on, inter alia, trade zones, currency zones, common language or risk profile. In
an application of factor models to international business cycles, Kose et al (2003) used geographical
regions because countries that are physically close to each other are likely to be highly connected
20This minimizes the influence of potential outliers. Moreover, it discards countries with extremely low level of
portfolio investment.
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through trade. In our framework, the case for geographical regions is not as straightforward. On the
one hand, investors might still invest in (or exit) regions because they anticipate that geographical
regions move together, supposedly because of trade or financial connections. Moreover, the presence
of so-called “dedicated funds” that have restricted mandates to invest only in particular regions of
the world also supports the use of geographical regions. On the other hand, many global funds or
funds with a thematic focus - such as high-yield bond funds or sector-specific funds - are known
to enter (or leave) subsets of countries with no clear geographic or economic links. If the latter
were to dominate in our sample, then geographical regions could end up being a rather poor proxy
of the true regional decomposition. Although evaluating the full set of competing regions is far
beyond the scope of this paper, both models are also re-evaluated using two alternative regional
groupings, each of them representing an extreme “paradigm”: (i) a geographic decomposition and
(ii) a development decomposition.21 The performance of the models under these three regional
decompositions are then compared using as a criteria (i) the increase in the share of variance
accounted for by the regional factor (ii) the precision of (estimated) regional factors.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 World Factors and Factor Loadings
Estimated world factors for equity and bond flows are plotted respectively in Figures 5 and 6. For
simplicity, country-specific world factor loadings for the full sample of countries are reported in
Appendix B.
Both Figures 5 and 6 highlight important findings. First, we find that in both models the interval
between the dashed lines - which delineate the 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles for the posterior distribution
- and the solid line is very narrow, implying that the world factor is estimated precisely and that
there is clear common driving force in international portfolio funding. Second, the cyclical behavior
of the world factors is apparent in both figures, although the longer time series available for the
equity model highlights this feature more clearly. To emphasize this cyclical behavior further,
Figures 7 and 8 decompose the world factors in periods of global surges (in green) and global
retrenchments (in red). Doing so, we see clearly that periods of global inflows and outflows tend to
alternate, although the length of the cycles differs over time. Finally, a look at the factor loadings
shows that, for both equity and bond flows: (i) all countries have a positive coefficient and (ii)
emerging markets tend to have a higher coefficient. In other words, although all countries move in
the same direction after a unit deviation in the world factor (either receiving/losing funding), the
21The geographic paradigm assumes 5 regions: (i) North America (ii) Latin America (iii) Europe (v) Africa and
Middle East (vi) Asia. The development paradigm assumes only two regions, namely (i) developed countries and
(ii) developing/emerging markets.
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magnitude of the change is greater for developing or emerging markets. This, in turn, confirms
the higher amplitude of both surge and retrenchment phases in emerging regions highlighted in
Section 2.
What might cause all investors to invest - or liquidate their positions - at the international level? To
gain some insight about what the world factor is capturing, we first plot the world factors against
notable economic and financial events in Appendix B. This qualitative analysis reveals that waves
tend to be generated by major financial stress events and/or changes in macroeconomic conditions
in developed economies. In particular, the US recession of the early 2000, the accounting scandals
or the Great Recession coincided with phases of massive global equity outflows. Similarly, interest
rate hikes or unexpected changes in the economic outlook in major markets - such as the EU or the
US - seem to have provoked global retrenchments in 2004, 2005 and 2006.22 Conversely, declines in
financial stress, low interest rates or good economic news triggered global waves of equity inflows.
A very similar picture emerge for bonds flows although bond flows reacted only after Lehman’s
bankruptcy in September 2008.
To confirm formally the importance of financial and macroeconomic conditions in developed coun-
tries in driving the direction of global portfolio flows, we regress the equity and bond world factors
on a set of explanatory variables mapping these different dimensions. Tables 3 and 4 report the
results of a regression of world factors on (i) the Financial Stress Index computed by the Kansas
City Fed (henceforth KCFSI)23 (ii) the level of short term interest rates in developed economies
measured as the unweighted average of Fed funds (in the US) and main ECB refinancing rate (in
the Eurozone) and (iii) economic news shock series in the G10 countries measured by the Citi
Index of Economic surprises.24 Given the importance of inflation for bond investors, we also use
a global inflation news shock series for the bond factor regression.25 Both levels and differences of
the variables are considered when relevant.
Looking at tables 3 and 4, we find that all regressors help to explain the waves of portfolio flows,
although some types of shock seem to matter more in crisis periods than during normal times.
For the global equity factor, we find that, using the full sample, increases in financial stress and
(unexpected) poor economic outlook in advanced markets are strongly associated with global
outflows. Using only the sample before the GFC, the level of financial stress and the level of interest
22The US Federal reserve hike by 25 basis point in early 2006 triggered massive equity outflows, in particular from
Asian emerging markets. Between May and July 2006, Asia Pacific stock markets experienced their biggest decline
since 2002.
23The Kansas City Fed is a monthly measure of stress in the US financial system based on 11 financial market
variables and captures both liquidity conditions and risk appetite. For a review of the methodology, see Hakkio and
Keaton (2009).
24The Citigroup Economic Surprises index is defined as a weighted historical standard deviation of data surprises.
A positive reading of the index implies that economic releases have on balance been better than the market consensus.
25the global inflation news shock is computed as the unweighted average of the G10 and Emerging Markets Citi
index of Inflation data surprises.
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Variables Full Sample
(2001-2011)
Sub-Sample 1
(2001-2007)
Sub-sample 2
(2007-2011)
KCFSI -0.09* -0.5*** 0.04
∆KCFSI -0.46*** -0.29 -0.53***
G10 Economic News 0.007*** 0.006* 0.01***
Int. Rates -0.33** -0.87*** -0.16
∆Int. Rates 0.25 0.5 -0.17
constant 0.99** 2.7*** 0.35
R-Square 0.26 0.38 0.37
N 126 73 53
p-values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate respectively 10%,
5% and 1% significance thresholds.
Table 3: Equity World Factor - Regression Results
Variables Full Sample (2005-2011) Sub sample (2007-2011)
KCFSI -0.03 -0.03
∆KCFSI -0.3*** -0.29**
G10 Economic News 0.004* 0.004*
Global Inflation -0.030*** -0.035***
constant 0.07 0.08
R-Square 0.43 0.63
N 77 57
p-values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate respectively 10%,
5% and 1% significance thresholds.
Table 4: Bond World Factor - Regression Results
20
rates become significant at the 1% level. Finally, changes in the level of financial stress and global
economic news clearly dominate other regressors over the GFC period. One way to interpret these
results is that during normal times, the level of financial stress as well as the level of interest rate
- which proxy for both liquidity conditions and the opportunity cost of holding equity over bonds
- are guiding equity portfolio flows. On the other hand, in periods of high financial stress, changes
in financial stress - rather than its level - and economic news in developed economies are more
important “signals” for investors. Table 4 confirms this broad picture for the bond world factor
for changes in financial stress and economic news remain significant.26 Interestingly, table 6 also
reveals the importance of inflation news in driving bond flows. In particular, unexpected increases
in inflation are strongly associated to global bond outflows.
3.2.2 Regional factors
Appendix B reports estimated regional factors using the regional decomposition for which the share
of regional variance and the precision of factors is higher. Two findings are noteworthy. First,
we find that the neither the geographic paradigm nor the development paradigm substantially
improve the performance of the equity model.27 As a consequence, factors reported in Appendix
B are based on the seven benchmark regions. Under this decomposition, we find that although the
regional factors are quite precisely estimated for developed Europe, Emerging Europe and Middle
East/African countries, the confidence intervals are larger for North America, Latin America and
Emerging Asia. This suggests that there is still room to improve the fit of regional dynamics in
equity flows. On the other hand, we find that regional bond flows dynamics seem to be better
represented by the “development” paradigm. Under this specification, we find that despite a drop
in the performance of the model for some advanced countries, the model (i) substantially increases
the share of regional variance for almost all developing countries and (ii) yields a precise estimate
of the bond flows dynamics in emerging markets. To see this, table 5 below reports the difference
in the share of variance explained by the regional factor under the final development grouping
and the “benchmark” specification. This finding suggests that although advanced markets are still
better represented by the benchmark regional decomposition, emerging markets have a tendency
to move altogether, i.e receiving (or losing) bond funding at the same time.
26For endogeneity reasons, we took the level of global interest rates out of the bond regression.
27Full results available on request.
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Table 5: Benchmark vs development regional decomposition - Bond Model
3.2.3 Variance decompositions
Building on the factor estimations derived above, we now assess the importance of each factor at
the country level using equation (10).28 Variance decompositions for the full sample of countries
are reported in Appendix B. For simplicity, tables 6 and 7 below report only world and regional
averages.
Using unweighted averages over the whole sample, we first find that the world factor, the regional
factors and the country specific factors explain, respectively, 44 %, 35% and 22% of the overall
variance of countries’ equity funding and 72%, 18% and 10% of their bond funding. Although the
impact of world conditions might be inflated by the presence of the GFC, in particular in the bond
sample, these results clearly highlight the quantitative importance of global dynamics in driving
portfolio investments. In addition, we also find that world averages conceal a great deal of the
cross-country heterogeneity we observe in the full sample. In general, we find that (i) emerging
countries display a great dependence on global factors and (ii) advanced economies are mainly
impacted by regional dynamics. In the case of equity flows, more than two thirds of emerging
markets cross the 50% threshold of variance accounted for by the global factor, and half of them
28Note that samples drawn from the Markov chain at each step are not necessarily uncorrelated due to sampling
error. Following Kose et al. (2003), we make sure θwi , θ
r
i and θ
c
i sum up to one by orthogonalizing the factors (using
the world-region-country factor ordering) when computing the variance decompositions at each replication.
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cross the 75% threshold. Some countries - such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia or even Brazil -
are close to 90%, implying that 90% of the variability of their equity portfolio funding is due to the
changes in the global trend. On the other hand, developed economies, such as Western European
countries, are substantially affected by regional dynamics, probably as a result of the high level of
trade and monetary integration within the European Union. In fact, only a handful of countries
receive (or lose) funding as a result of idiosyncratic dynamics. In the case of equity flows, only 6
countries - Austria, Germany, the USA, Chile, Argentina and Greece - cross the 50% threshold of
variance accounted for by country-specific factors, and only two - Switzerland and the USA - in
the case of bond flows. In other words, countries with high idiosyncratic influence are either (i)
developed countries that are typically regional economic leaders and/or reserve currencies (United
States, Germany, Japan, Sweden) or (ii) countries that have experienced one (or more) financial
crisis over the period (Argentina or Greece).
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         
         
  
Table 7: Bond Variance Decomposition - Regional Averages
4 Discussion of the results
4.1 The geography of contagion
Previous variance decompositions have clearly highlighted the extent of co-movement in institu-
tional investor flows. To what extent are these co-movements likened to contagion? and who is
affected? Although discussing all the definitions and types of contagion is beyond the scope of this
paper,29 we argue that some of the dynamics we identify reflect more contagion effects than simple
interdependence. On the one hand, the existence of an “emerging market” region in the bond model
29See Claessens and Forbes (2001) for a review of the different definitions.
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implies that all emerging markets tend to lose (or gain) funding at the same time, irrespective of
their actual location or macroeconomic environment. Although its quantitative importance seems
to be dwarfed by the presence of the GFC in our sample, such an emerging market dynamic is in
line with the emergence of emerging market bonds as an asset class per se, in which investors herd
when in search for yield and retrench from when conditions deteriorate. In addition, this finding
would rationalize the fact that spreads on emerging market bonds tend to move in tandem over
time, although no clear (bilateral) trade or financial connection exist across these markets30.
Second, we find that many countries are in fact subject to the “global contagion” channel highlighted
recently by Jotikasthira et al (2012): using data on global funds, authors found that funding shocks
at “home”, i.e where funds are domiciled, translate into fire sales (and purchases) in countries within
the same portfolio, in particular emerging markets31. As a result, shocks in “core” countries tend
to be propagated to countries in the “periphery”, thereby generating surges (stops) in emerging
markets when conditions improve (deteriorate) at home. Our results are strongly in line with such
a transmission channel: with the exception of a handful of developed markets, the evolution of the
portfolio funding of most countries turns out to be driven by shocks originating in the domicile of
funds, i.e in advanced countries. Developing countries, in particular, happen to be the substantially
affected by these “push” effects coming from developed markets. To get a better picture of the
geography and intensity of this global contagion, Figures 9 and 10 map the fraction of variance
in Equity and Bond funding attributable to the world factor, θwi . For both equity and bonds, the
“heat maps” show that the domiciles of funds, i.e advanced countries, are not substantially affected
by global waves of inflows (or outflows). On the other hand, emerging markets at the periphery
display very high sensitivity levels, both in relative and absolute terms.
4.2 Country Characteristics and Global Contagion Sensitivity
The strength of global contagion in both equity and bond flows naturally raises the issue of the
determinants of countries’ sensitivity to global shocks. Why are some countries more sensitive to
global contagion than others? In other words, what makes investors eager to enter (leave) a country
when conditions improve (deteriorate) ? This section addresses this question by investigating the
economic features that scale the impact of global conditions at the country level. To do so, we
regress the fraction of variance attributable to the world factor, θwi , on a set of 14 structural
variables that we group into 6 categories covering a wide range of characteristics : (i) Rule of law
30Mc Guire and Schrijvers (2003) found that a single common factor explains approximately 80% of the common
variation in a panel of 15 emerging markets bond spreads.
31Similarly, Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) found that when some country returns change or crises strike, both
investors and managers respond by adjusting their investments substantially in the whole portfolio, thereby trans-
mitting shocks across countries.
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Figure 9: Sensitivity to Global Contagion - Equity flows
Note: values reported in the bottom left panel indicate the range of values for θwi . Numbers in parenthesis indicate
the number of countries in each range.
Figure 10: Sensitivity to Global Contagion - Bond flows
26
and investor protection (ii) Political instability (ii) Transparency, Governance and Accountability
at the corporate level (iii) Sound money (iv) Economic risk (v) Public Finance (vi) Distance.
We measure the strength of rule of law, and more generally the strength of investor protection
using two different variables: the rule of law index from the Economic Freedom of the World
database32 along with the strength of investor protection index provided by the International
Financial Corporation. Political instability is proxied by the political risk rating, which is an index
computed by ICRG and assesses the degree of government stability, likelihood of internal (and
external) conflict and corruption. The transparency, governance and accountability of economic
actors within the country are respectively measured by the extent of disclosure index, extent of
director liability index and the ease of shareholder suits index. All of these indexes measure the
strength of the outside investor protection against misuse of the corporate assets for personal gain.33
The strength of money is proxied by the standard deviation of annual inflation and the average
real money growth over the last five years, both proxying for the likelihood of inflation booms
affecting asset values. The economic risk is proxied by (i) the past output volatility measured by
the standard deviation of GDP growth between 1960-2006, (ii) the level of trade openness measured
as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, and (iii) the GDP per capita. The level of financial
risk is measured using the level public debt to GDP and the budget balance as % of GDP. Finally,
to proxy for the general level of information asymmetry, we use the distance between the investors
and the recipient countries. In fact, because an overwhelming majority of fund are located in the
US and in Europe, the variable distance is an average of the distance between country i and the
US (New York) and the distance between country i and Europe (London). Sources, units, and
summary statistics are provided for all variables in Appendix A. Finally, qualitative indexes and
risk ratings are computed such that a higher value of the variable implies a better assessment in
the given dimension.
Although the range of potential variables affecting countries’ sensitivity to shocks is vast, we
emphasize that these 14 variables span many of the channels that have been highlighted in the
existing literature. For instance, Chari and Kehoe (2003) present a model in which countries suffer
high capital flow volatility because investors fear expropriation. Alternatively, in the presence of
agency frictions, changes in global conditions have been shown to increase the incentives of insiders
to take advantage of outsiders, leading external investors to exit countries with lower disclosure
and transparency standards. In this vein, Pasquariello (2007) develops a model in which lower
32This index combines indicators of judicial independence, contract enforcement, military interference in the rule
of law and protection of property rights.
33The 3 indicators map different dimensions: transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure
index), liability for self-dealing (extent of director liability index) and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and
directors for misconduct (ease of shareholder suits index). The data come from a survey of corporate and securities
lawyers and are based on securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules of evidence.
The ranking on the strength of investor protection index is the simple average of the percentile rankings on its
component indicators.
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information heterogeneity (i.e. more transparency) within a market improves inference about its
liquidation values, thus making that market less vulnerable to external shocks. Such a channel
would also be consistent with several empirical studies that emphasized the role of transparency
as a determinant of fund flows.34 Investigating the role of distance, seminal empirical finance
papers have used gravity models to analyse the determinants of cross-border financial stocks and
flows and found that information asymmetries are well captured by geographic distance35. As
a consequence, one might expect that beside hard measure of information imperfection (such as
transparency indices), soft measures, such as the distance between fund domiciles and the recipient
country, might increase flows volatility. Finally, lower global economic growth might jeopardize the
ability of agents to repay debtors. Therefore, one could expect countries that are financially fragile
and/or historically more dependent on world demand to suffer from pro-cyclical flows insofar as
investors expect them to be more affected by the global cycle.
Although considering a wide set of variables enables us to run a “horse race” among these com-
peting channels, the increase in the number of regressors comes at a price. In particular, the
limited cross section at our disposal implies that classical regression methods are of limited use in
sorting out robust correlates from irrelevant variables. To address this issue, we use two Bayesian
model averaging techniques to test the robustness of competing variables: the WALS methodology
developed by Magnus et al (2010) and the more standard BMA popularized by Sala-i-Martin,
Doppelhoffer and Miller (2004) in the context of growth econometrics.36 Intuitively, the objective
of Model Averaging is to address the problem of model uncertainty by (i) running the maximum
combination of models (16.000 in our case) and (ii) providing estimates and inference results that
take into account the performance of the variable not only in the final “reported” model but over
the whole set of specifications. In practice, these two steps boil down to estimate a parameter of
interest conditional on each model in the model space and computing the unconditional estimate
as a weighted average of the conditional estimates.37 Tables 8 and 9 below report the results of
Bayesian Averaging for both equity and bond regressions. Because we are not interested in the
magnitude of the coefficient per se but in the sign and the robustness of each regressor, we report
only the sign of the coefficients along with two Bayesian criteria: individual Post-Inclusion Prob-
abilities (henceforth PIPs) for BMA and t-ratios for WALS. Magnus et al (2010) suggest a PIP
threshold of 0.5 for inclusion of a variable whereas, in the case of WALS, a t-ratio with an absolute
value of 1 or greater is typically recommended as a threshold for robustness.38 Only variables
34Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that institutional investors reveal a preference for stocks of countries with strong
disclosure standards. Gelos and Wei (2005) who also find that emerging market mutual funds (i) prefer to invest in
more transparent countries and (ii) liquidate in priority assets invested in non transparent countries during crises.
35See Portes and Rey (2005) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001).
36From a technical point of view, the BMA technique used here follows Fernandez, Ley, and Steel (2001), recently
applied in Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008).
37See Magnus et al (2010) for an extensive review.
38For a discussion of these significance criteria see Magnus et al (2010).
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that are identified as robust by both methods are considered as robust regressors. To help the
interpretation of the results from the Bayesian analysis, table 10 also reports the results of the
regression of the Equity (Bond) factor using only the variables identified as “robust”.
Using the Bayesian criteria, we find that three criteria - political risk, trade openness and distance
- are robust in the equity specification, while only two - political risk and distance - are robust in
the bond specification. This finding suggests that investors facing shocks at home tend to modify
their exposure to a wide set of countries. However, they do all the more so in “risky” countries.
Our results suggest that the level of political risk and the distance act as the main “risk criteria”
in the eyes of fund managers. As a result, sudden surges/stops tend to strike fragile countries,
i.e emerging markets with unstable political systems and poor connection to the main financial
centers.
Equity Sample BMA WALS
Variables Coeff. PIP Coeff t-ratio
Rule of law - 0.07 + 0.2
Investor protection + 0.10 - -0.73
Political risk - 1.00 - -2.38
Disclosure index - 0.12 + 0.71
Manager liability (index) + 0.14 + 0.76
Shareholder suits (index) + 0.16 + 0.77
Inflation volatility + 0.08 - -0.26
Real money growth + 0.08 + 0.35
Output volatility + 0.11 + 0.27
Trade openness + 0.60 + 1.50
GDP per capita - 0.12 - -0.94
Public debt - 0.20 - -0.97
Budget balance - 0.07 - -0.01
Distance + 0.97 + 2.60
Table 8: Equity World Factor sensitivity: Country Characteristics
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Bond sample BMA WALS
Variables Coeff. PIP Coeff t-ratio
Rule of law - 0.13 + 1.13
Investor protection + 0.12 - -0.73
Political risk - 0.77 - -1.70
Disclosure index + 0.20 + 0.71
Manager liability (index) + 0.08 + 0.76
Shareholder suits (index) + 0.08 + 0.77
Inflation volatility - 0.08 - 0.22
Real money growth - 0.10 + -1.08
Output volatility + 0.11 + 0.27
Trade openness + 0.14 + 0.85
GDP per capita - 0.21 - -1.08
Public debt - 0.09 - -0.97
Budget balance - 0.27 + 1.20
Distance + 0.99 + 2.30
Table 9: Bond World Factor sensitivity: Country Characteristics
Equity - Robust Variables Coeff P-value
Political risk -0.012 0.00
Trade openness 0.006 0.07
Distance 0.024 0.00
R-square 0.56
Number of Observations 55
Bond - Robust Variables Coeff P-value
Political risk -0.007 0.00
Distance 0.009 0.03
R-square 0.41
Number of Observations 70
Table 10: Regression Output - Equity (left) and Bond (right)
4.3 Push vs Pull factors in Portfolio investments
A major question running through the capital flow literature is whether the forces that drive capital
flows are attributable to external “push” factors or to domestic “pull” factors. Thus far, evidence
has been mixed. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1998)
and Kim (2000) argued that ‘push’ factors are more important than domestic fundamentals in
driving waves of capital inflows and outflows. However, Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2004) analyzed
the role of domestic and global equity market performance argued that both are important in
understanding cross-border equity flows. In general, the consensus is that capital flows are driven
by “a mix of domestic, contagion, and global shocks” (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Our results
clearly support the presence of strong push factors driving portfolio investments at the global level.
In particular, financial stress, macroeconomic news and interest rates in advanced markets seem
to be the main source of “push” factors, inducing international investors to increase (or reduce)
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exposure to foreign markets. However, we also find that structural “pull” factors (such as political
stability and distance) determine the exact direction and magnitude of these waves of portfolio
flows.
Taken together, these findings are well connected to other empirical contributions that have em-
phasized the importance of mature market conditions - such as interest rates, liquidity, risk levels
or weak economic performance - in generating capital movements.39 Recently, Ghosh et al. (2012)
also found that although surges in capital flows to EMEs are driven by push factors, domes-
tic pull factors tend to determine their destination and their magnitudes. On the other hand,
they also seriously downplay the relevance of short-term pull factors, such as purely domestic
growth/productivity shocks, in driving flows. In our sample, most countries turn out to be domi-
nated by external conditions and only a handful of countries economies - regional economic leaders
or countries experiencing a crisis - seem to be driven by idiosyncratic dynamics. In fact, our find-
ings appear more in line with the most recent case studies that find “little or no role for domestic
macroeconomic conditions”.40
Finally, we emphasize that previous push vs pull factor decompositions should be interpreted
with caution. After regressing common observed factors on a panel of capital flows, most studies
tend to interpret the residuals as a proxy for the importance of pull factors (see in particular
Fratzscher (2012)). However, given the importance of regional co-movement in capital flows, such
a method tends to interpret as an idiosyncratic dynamic what is in fact the result of regional co-
movement. Although these regional dynamics might reflect truly regional “pull” factors (capturing
strong regional macroeconomic dynamics, see for instance the case of Western Europe in the
equity model), others may simply reflect contagion effects that do not reflect any commonality (e.g
emerging markets region in the bond model). Although discussing and estimating the potential
bias in existing studies in far beyond the scope of this paper, we stress that the omission of regional
dynamics in previous push vs pull factor decompositions probably overestimated the actual impact
of pull factors.41
39Fratzscher (2012) found that during the GFC global shocks (key crisis events, changes to global liquidity and
risk measured by the VIX) had a large effect on capital flows during both the crisis and the recovery. Kim (2000)
found that capital movements in four developing countries (Mexico, Korea, Chile and Malaysia) was largely due to
external reasons such as decreases in the world interest rate and recession in industrial countries. See Forbes and
Warnock (2012) for further references on the importance of conditions in large economies in driving capital flows.
40See for instance Alper (2000) in the case of Turkey and Mexico, or Kim (2000) for Chile, Mexico, Korea and
Malaysia.
41Given that, in our sample, some regional factors account for more than 80% of portfolio flows dynamics, the
actual bias could be substantial.
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5 Conclusion
Using an extensive dataset of fund flows to 81 developed and emerging markets, this paper explored
the dynamics and geography of institutional investors flows between 2001 and 2011. Using a factor
model in the spirit of Kose, Otrok and Whiteman (2003), we decomposed equity and bond flows
into world, regional and idiosyncratic components and highlighted the importance of both global
and regional dynamics in institutional investors flows. More importantly, we highlighted a number
of “pathological” behaviours of the fund industry, ranging from procyclical lending at the world
level to regional and global contagion, with a substantial impact on a vast number of emerging
markets.
We conclude by emphasizing that some the findings of this paper raise important additional issues
that deserve further attention. First, the patterns of contagion we observe in our sample seem to
reflect, to a certain extent, the structure of the financial industry itself. For instance, the intensity
of the global contagion might be a sign of the growing importance of so-called global funds who
invest both in advanced economies and in emerging markets (Sy and Ong (2013)). In addition, the
fact that regional dynamics fit geographical regions in the equity model might be the result of the
dominance of regional funds in the equity market, whereas the dichotomy between advanced and
emerging markets in the bond model might reflect the dominance of funds with a mandate to invest
in either all emerging markets or all advanced economies (e.g high-yield vs low-yield bond funds).
This suggests, in turn, that management rules and portfolio restrictions probably shape the form
of contagion.42 In that case, monitoring the portfolio of major investors could help predicting the
way contagion is likely to spread and designing appropriate policy responses. Second, it seems that
the rise of institutional investors is coming at a price, including pro-cyclical lending, contagion and
spillovers. Our results, in particular, clearly support the view that institutional investors do not
act as “deep-pocket” investors at the global level, thereby playing a stabilizing role (in particular
buying assets at low prices in crisis times). We argue that this prescribes a better examination
of the costs and benefits associated with the rise of the fund industry, in particular with respect
to other traditional sources of external funding in emerging markets (such as banks and retail
investors).
42Note that this issue has recently been touched by Pavlova and Rigobon (2008)
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Appendix A - EPFR Dataset and other definitions
Figures and tables below provide a better overview of the type of funds covered by the EFPR
dataset, as well as some useful definitions and computations. Note that when classifying funds
in the database, EPFR looks at multiple factors from the prospectus/fact sheet. However, some
funds characteristics are imputed to all funds in the EPFR databse, whereas some are not. For
instance, all funds have a domicile (as every fund is tied to a company that is based in a specific
country), a specific currency, and are classified as either an ETF or a “regular” mutual fund. On the
other hand, not all funds in the database are categorized as Retail/Institutional, Active/Passive,
benchmark/non-benchmark followers. When this is the case, we report the share of “unclassified
funds”, i.e the share of funds for which the EFPR did not find enough information to justify a
particular classification.
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Table 11: EPFR fund coverage, by fund group - Q1 2013
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Table 12: EPFR fund coverage by asset type, 2001-2013
424 88123 23231 5005 52953 6934 0,01 0 1 0,840724976
386 86965 22582 5087 52525 6771 0 0 1 0,850343295
376 81438 20848 4776 49661 6154 0 0 1 0,855721232
378 79368 20344 4877 47771 6375 0 -0 1 0,853402526
317 66416 16831 4340 40043 5201 -0 -0 1 0,862788431
329 71512 18114 4831 43255 5313 0 0 1 0,85845133
377 79680 20883 5109 48113 5575 -0 0 1 0,85618185
347 83956 21764 5374 50896 5922 0 0 1 0,851127464
76633 88844 23878 5841 53556 5569 -0 0 1 0,866211305
77180 90179 24795 5739 53918 5727 0 0 1 0,863986066
344 97675 27092 6323 57959 6301 0,01 0 1 0,8393122
82704 99337 27550 6916 58656 6215 -0 0 1 0,856439371
83271 98454 27825 7094 57857 5677 0,01 0 1 0,859219916
82984 90331 26663 6313 53028 4328 0,01 -0 1 0,86355134
72865 81169 24282 5378 48004 3505 0 -0 1 0,863574472
72602 81405 24293 5487 47941 3685 -0 0 1 0,86368404
61684 73089 21904 5246 42899 3040 0 0 1 0,862570912
65800 75392 21543 5830 44757 3262 0 0 1 0,865292025
69106 79973 23484 5836 47417 3236 0 0 1 0,86484247
66813 77596 22151 5645 46550 3250 0 0 1 0,862884845
63476 77704 22833 5680 46069 3122 0 0 1 0,859453837
59785 76415 22339 5935 45177 2963 0 0 1 0,858279377
59651 74428 21673 5718 43911 3127 0 -0 1 0,86021027
67733 80283 21778 6788 47954 3763 0 0 1 0,864152355
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Table 13: EPFR Equity funds by geographic focus, 2001-2013
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80157,81 207049,02 6190,95 33743,06 3002,09 3078,6 26701,42
82081,22 210252,35 5694,53 35443,3 3302 3161,61 28022,14
84529,24 211760,13 5909,16 37093,38 3422,42 3723,29 29031,9
83323,53 206966,15 5899,3 36743,38 3399,26 3787,29 28697,74
85581,83 209866,31 6269,16 37986,17 3500,12 3813,91 29806,1
85384,78 212492,32 6026,88 39460,97 3660,48 3719,59 31190,17
89114,91 223165,94 5186 40828,05 3718,65 3818,18 32422,9
90328,77 224849,91 6880,91 42487,81 3686,75 4238,92 33985,52
92469,44 227773,82 7079,27 44776,99 3711,39 4607,93 35584,54
105557,77 225534 7433,57 47327,84 3683,19 4856,48 37802,7
119026,62 224824,34 7443,11 47934,29 3420,43 5267,68 38278,33
117470,9 225410,66 7030,41 49077,49 3303,7 5089,83 39672,96
123247,43 226518,1 7373,51 50223,07 3170,86 5109,17 40947,26
126453,14 229076,78 7362,39 53437,72 3223,63 5481,17 44036,83
127539,68 230473,12 7664,54 56999,29 3200,44 5763,95 46984,86
128070,65 227624,4 7875,09 55391,13 3111,21 5872,44 45432,35
131356,46 228406,14 8172,19 58111,72 3209,8 5921,1 48006,29
134580,88 226499,02 8102,27 56606,42 3168,4 5685,06 46773,61
131850,26 224336,49 7704,31 54970,22 3091,45 5085,59 45888,77
133400,5 227305,76 7890,27 56435,65 3126,54 5229,55 47238,91
137127,5 11,11 231222,34 8083,89 59131,44 3316,58 5237,15 49563,5
139031,43 11,21 232907,37 8036,98 59604,99 3434,55 4936,63 50291,84
145392,84 11,29 242070,99 13538,2 61950,05 3528,38 4960,65 52513,94
154036,51 11,38 246463,06 14095,44 64807,47 3761,68 5142,64 54962,06
158434,65 11,43 248521,13 15594,79 66736,19 3868,3 5075,48 56867,7
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Table 14: EPFR Bond funds by geographic focus, 2003-2013
11,85% 24,43% 5,95% 6,01% 4,90% 0,4412822 0,00109359
12,16% 24,38% 5,88% 5,94% 4,82% 0,41580731 0,00127723
12,37% 24,13% 5,90% 5,96% 4,88% 0,31980247 0,00142585
12,48% 23,96% 5,83% 5,88% 4,83% 0,30010932 0,00143477
12,40% 24,23% 5,81% 5,86% 4,93% 0,29083588 0,001518
12,56% 24,45% 5,79% 5,83% 5,07% 0,28633091 0,00156623
12,46% 24,22% 5,82% 5,86% 5,08% 0,28798597 0,00133391
12,46% 24,11% 5,83% 5,87% 5,15% 0,25946428 0,00135807
12,58% 23,83% 5,86% 5,89% 5,34% 0,2596931 0,00141595
12,59% 23,68% 6,06% 6,08% 5,68% 0,27594109 1,17902E-05 0,00139183
12,53% 23,51% 6,23% 6,25% 5,74% 0,28925662 1,27527E-05 0,00118003
12,64% 23,47% 6,21% 6,25% 5,68% 0,26832461 0 0,00130999
12,48% 23,19% 6,27% 6,29% 5,88% 0,45577796 6,05296E-06 0,00118424
12,59% 23,23% 6,32% 6,32% 6,21% 0,44150303 5,95698E-06 0,00108827
12,61% 23,68% 6,39% 6,41% 5,98% 0,38366877 5,53317E-06 0,00105631
12,44% 24,10% 6,39% 6,39% 6,24% 0,3774505 1,06165E-05 0,00096463
12,95% 24,19% 6,42% 6,42% 6,49% 0,36619237 1,55088E-05 0,00090979
12,73% 23,94% 6,38% 6,37% 6,53% 0,35950137 1,66994E-05 0,00088706
12,84% 23,50% 6,60% 6,58% 6,95% 0,36834183 6,32279E-05 0,00142957
13,05% 23,78% 6,65% 6,64% 6,90% 0,35302519 5,11406E-05 0,001635
13,12% 23,77% 6,53% 6,49% 7,19% 0,32588399 5,19026E-05 0,00157075
13,12% 23,86% 6,54% 6,51% 7,01% 0,31948804 5,61505E-05 0,0017746
13,39% 24,14% 6,62% 6,59% 7,01% 0,29936339 6,01524E-05 0,00170358
13,34% 24,92% 6,67% 6,62% 7,43% 0,29020433 6,90022E-05 0,00153764
13,42% 25,06% 6,72% 6,66% 7,63% 0,27067299 0,000177645 0,00136294
13,80% 25,63% 6,66% 6,61% 7,52% 0,25386699 0,000179838 0,00149313
14,03% 25,74% 6,57% 6,52% 7,39% 0,24290823 0,000202591 0,00144458
14,06% 25,26% 6,48% 6,45% 6,92% 0,26058281 0,000229086 0,00143369
14,25% 24,50% 6,47% 6,45% 6,68% 0,25861619 0,000231972 0,00122708
14,42% 25,25% 6,54% 6,52% 6,72% 0,25486711 0,000249243 0,0011854
14,59% 24,81% 6,49% 6,50% 6,36% 0,2523878 0,000245995 0,00101567
14,58% 24,71% 6,45% 6,48% 6,06% 0,26089152 0,000206552 0,00103818
14,84% 25,72% 6,60% 6,64% 6,01% 0,24854276 0,000207048 0,0009113
14,61% 26,02% 6,49% 6,53% 5,94% 0,25859057 0,000200139 0,00089377
14,70% 26,50% 6,59% 6,62% 6,14% 0,24839584 0,000203107 0,00084959
14,96% 26,49% 6,55% 6,56% 6,43% 0,26764345 0,000195173 0,00091944
15,09% 26,52% 6,57% 6,58% 6,42% 0,26107112 0,000202915 0,00081097
15,25% 26,22% 6,54% 6,54% 6,44% 0,25320423 0,00020454 0,00079051
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Table 16: EPFR funds - Share of ETFs vs Non-ETFs
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North
America
Latin
America
Western
Europe
Eastern
Europe
MEA Developed
Asia
Emerging
Asia
Canada Argentina Austria Bosnia-
Herz.
Botswana Australia China
United
States
Brazil Belgium Bulgaria Egypt Hong
Kong
India
Chile Denmark Croatia Ghana Japan Indonesia
Colombia Finland Czech
Republic
Iraq Korea
Rep.
Malaysia
Costa
Rica
France Estonia Israel New
Zealand
Philippines
Cuba Germany Hungary Ivory
Coast
Singapore Sri lanka
Dominican
Rep.
Greece Lithuania Kazakhstan Taiwan Thailand
Ecuador Ireland Poland Lebanon Vietnam
El
Salvador
Italy Romania Mauritius
Guatemala Netherlands Russian
Fed.
Morocco
Jamaica Norway Serbia Nigeria
Mexico Portugal Slovenia Pakistan
Nicaragua Spain Ukraine Qatar
Panama Sweden South
Africa
Peru Switzerland Tunisia
Uruguay U.K Turkey
Venezuela Zambia
Zimbabwe
Table 19: Compositions of Regions
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Appendix B - Supplementary Figures, Tables and Sources
Variable Source and Date Unit
Rule of law Economic Freedom of the World
dataset (2000-2005)
Qualitative index from 1 (poor) to
10 (strong)
Investor
Protection
International Finance Corporation
(World Bank)
Qualitative index from 0 (low) to
10 (high)
Political risk International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG)
Qualitative index from 0 (high
risk) to 100 (low risk)
Extent of
Disclosure
International Finance Corporation
(World Bank)
Qualitative index from 0 (low) to
10 (high)
Extent of
Director
Liability
International Finance Corporation
(World Bank)
Qualitative index from 0 (low) to
10 (high)
Ease of
Shareholder
suits
International Finance Corporation
(World Bank)
Qualitative index from 0 (low) to
10 (high)
Inflation
volatility
Economic Freedom of the World
dataset (2000-2005)
Qualitative index from 0 (high
volatility) to 10 (low volatility)
Real money
growth
Economic Freedom of the World
dataset (2000-2005)
Qualitative index from 0 (low
growth) to 10 (high growth)
Output
volatility
WDI Std deviation of output growth -
1960-2008
Trade
Openness
WDI (Imports+Exports)/GDP
GDP per
capita
WDI in 2005 dollars (PPP Adjusted)
Public debt WDI Government debt/GDP
Budget
Balance
WDI Cash surplus/deficit as % GDP
Weighted
Distance
Google Maps Thousands of kilometers
Table 20: Country characteristics - Sources and Units
Note: To avoid any endogeneity issues, real and financial variables - such as real money growth, inflation volatility,
public debt levels or trade openness - were introduced in the regression using pre-sample values (i.e using values as
of 2001 for Equity regressions, and as of 2004 for bond regression). For qualitative ratings, we used pre-GFC levels
(i.e 2005) but tested the robustness of the results using values in 2000 (when available). Results were unchanged.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Rule of law 76 6.1 2.4 0 9.6
Investor protection 79 5.4 1.6 1.7 9.7
Political risk 78 71.4 12.7 35.5 93.5
Extent of Disclosure 79 5.8 2.75 0 10
Extent of Director Liability 79 4.4 2.47 0 9
Ease of Shareholder suits 79 6.0 2.03 1 10
Inflation volatility 76 7.4 3.23 0 9.9
Real money growth 76 7.7 2.75 0 10
Output volatility 80 4.9 3.9 1.5 24.9
Trade Openness 78 84 53 20 360
GDP per capita 78 16246 14011 1125 74163
Public debt 78 52.88 32 4.6 191
Budget balance 65 -1.19 3.4 -8.3 16.4
Weighted Distance 81 6.9 3.5 2.9 17
Table 21: Country characteristics - Summary statistics
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Figure 11: World Factor loadings - Equity model
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  
Figure 12: World Factor loadings - Bond model
NB: vertical lines indicate the magnitude of the factor loading. Dots and cones represent respectively the 0.05 and
0.95 quantiles of the posterior distribution.
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Figure 13: Equity World factor and Financial events
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Figure 14: Bond World Factor and Financial Events
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         
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
  
Table 22: Equity Variance Decompositions - Full Sample
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          
          
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
  
Table 23: Bond Variance Decompositions - Full Sample52
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Abstract
The “middle-income trap” is the phenomenon of hitherto rapidly growing economies stag-
nating at middle-income levels and failing to graduate into the ranks of high-income countries.
In this study we examine the middle-income trap as a special case of growth slowdowns. We
identify slowdowns as large sudden and sustained deviations from the growth path predicted
by a basic conditional convergence framework. We then examine their determinants by means
of probit regressions, looking into the role of institutions, demography, infrastructure, the
macroeconomic environment, output structure and trade structure. Two variants of Bayesian
Model Averaging are used as robustness checks. The results—including some that speak to the
special status of middle-income countries—are then used to derive policy implications. [JEL
C11, C25, O11, O43, O47]
1 Introduction
Until recently, most of the empirical research on the drivers of economic growth has implicitly
assumed growth to be a smooth process, consistent with a wide variety of theoretical models.
One strand of the literature, following the lead of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992), has examined the determinants of cross-country differences in average
GDP per capita growth rates over a long period (typically a decade or more) while another strand,
pioneered by Islam (1995) and Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) has relied on dynamic panels;
in either case, what is being estimated is a gradual convergence path under a single (specified or
∗This version is a shortened version of the IMF working paper reported in the reference list at the end of this
chapter. For additional results, graphs and tables, please refer to the original version available on the IMF website.
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unspecified) underlying model, with a single coefficient describing the dynamic behavior of a group
of countries.1
Yet as documented by Easterly and others (1993) and many others since then, growth dynamics is
very unstable in the real world, even at low frequencies. Why this is so remains to be fully under-
stood theoretically. In principle, it could simply be that there are large and frequent shifts in the
drivers of growth such as policies and institutions, with transitory—in an underlying neoclassical
model—or permanent—under an endogenous growth model—effects on growth. This seems a par-
tial explanation at best, however, as panel growth regressions are typically unable to account for
the bulk of the within-country variation in growth rates. Another, non-exclusive explanation could
be that a single underlying model is not an appropriate representation of the growth process for all
countries at all time. Indeed, a number of theories imply the possibility of shifts between growth
regimes, such as for instance models with poverty traps or that allow for multiple technologies more
broadly. On the empirical side, following Pritchett’s (2000) call for more attention to “the hills,
plateaus, mountains and plains” as a key source of variation in the data, a literature has arisen
that attempts to explore (sustained) growth turning points. For instance, Hausman, Pritchett and
Rodrik (2005) explore growth accelerations, Jermanowski (2006) examines transitions between dif-
ferent growth regimes in a Markov-switching framework, and Hausman, Rodriguez and Wagner
(2006) study of growth collapses.
The present paper contributes to this literature, focusing on growth slowdowns. Policy makers
are often more interested in the risks and opportunities arising from growth turning points than
in the very long-run drivers of growth. And in practice, anxiety about growth slowdowns has
been particularly acute in middle-income countries. Growing attention has been devoted in policy
debates (see e.g. Commission on Growth and Development, 2008) to the risk of a “middle-income
trap”, which may simply be defined as the phenomenon of hitherto rapidly growing economies
stagnating at middle-income levels and failing to graduate into the ranks of high-income countries.
Insofar as such a “trap” actually exists, several Latin American economies would seem to have fallen
into it in the past, having failed to achieve high-income levels despite growing rapidly and attaining
middle-income status several decades ago. By contrast, several East Asian economies, the so-called
“tigers”, have in recent decades escaped the trap, continuing to grow rapidly after attaining middle-
income status, and eventually attaining per capita income levels comparable to advanced countries.
A key policy issue is whether today’s fast-growing middle-income Asian economies, including China,
possibly India and several ASEAN countries, are more likely to emulate the former or the latter
trajectory. The issue has assumed particular urgency in the face of recent slowdowns in several
major emerging economies across diverse geographical regions: not just the Asian giants, but also
1Following the work of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), some studies have allowed the convergence co-efficient to
diverge across countries. But again, for each country the idea is that a single co-efficient adequately captures the
dynamical process, and that this co-efficient is the object most worthy of study.
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Brazil or South Africa.
Yet clear theoretical foundations for the existence of a middle-income trap have yet to be developed,
and empirical evidence so far is also very limited. One broad theoretical argument emphasizes the
roles of imitation as the main driver of technological catch-up at early stages of development and
of innovation at a later stage (e.g. Perez-Sebastian, 2007), with innovation requiring more complex
and harder-to-implement framework conditions, such as e.g. high-quality innovation, regulatory or
tertiary education policies (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008). A related argument
involves multiple equilibria, in the spirit of past models developed for poverty traps, with the
growth path of the economy being driven by the availability of certain key inputs or policies
required for innovation-driven growth (e.g. Agenor and Canuto, 2012). On the empirical side,
the only available research is Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2011, 2013), who for a sample of fast-
growing middle-income economies with GDP per capita levels exceeding (2005 PPP) US$10,000
find that slowdowns have occurred most frequently at income levels in the $10,000-$11,000 and
$15,000-$16,000 ranges, in both cases before countries reached high-income status.
In this paper, we study empirically the middle-income trap as a special case of growth slowdowns,
and attempt to make several contributions to the literature on growth turning points. First, we
propose a clear identification procedure for growth slowdowns, one that takes theory seriously
rather than simply relying on structural breaks in the time series patterns of economic growth.
Second, having identified slowdowns, we show that these episodes are indeed disproportionately
likely to occur in middle-income countries, thereby providing empirical justification for policy con-
cerns about the middle-income trap. Finally, the paper attempts to identify the determinants of
growth slowdowns in a systematic way. Acknowledging the wide uncertainty surrounding the deter-
minants of growth—and, by implication, of growth slowdowns—it relies on a comprehensive set of
explanatory variables and seeks to validate standard probit results using two variations of Bayesian
model selection —applying to growth turning points the kind of approach that has been applied
to growth rates in the past, e.g. by Sala-i-Martin, Dopplehofer and Miller (2004). This enables
us to identify the robust correlates of growth slowdowns and how these differ between middle-
income and other countries. We find that several dimensions of institutions, the macroeconomic
environment, demography, output and trade structure and infrastructure are important drivers of
the risk of a sustained growth slowdown. Middle-income countries differ from the broad sample in
key respects, e.g., deregulation and infrastructure are found to be disproportionately important in
reducing the risk of a slowdown.. These results are then used to derive policy implications, with a
special emphasis on fast-growing Asian economies.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I shows some stylized facts for a selected
group of Asian and Latin American countries to illustrate how heterogeneous growth paths can
be, and why growth slowdowns and stagnation at middle-income levels is of such policy relevance.
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Section II describes and executes our identification procedure for growth slowdowns and examines
whether middle-income countries are indeed at greater risk of undergoing such slowdowns. Section
III outlines our methodology for exploring their determinants and presents a selection of empirical
results. On this basis, Section IV draws some policy conclusions for fast-growing Asian economies.
2 Some Stylized Facts
The contrast between several successful East Asian economies and some unsuccessful Latin Amer-
ican economies in the past is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the evolution of GDP per capita
relative to U.S. levels for a set of countries once they have reached an income level of US$ 3000.2
Latin American countries such as Mexico, Peru, and Brazil reached that level before any of the
other countries in the chart, hence the longer time series for those countries and the higher in-
tercepts (since U.S. per capita income, the denominator, is smaller the further back in time we
go). Despite their relatively late start, two of the Asian “Tigers,” Korea and Taiwan Province
of China have progressed rapidly, increasing their per capita income from 10-20 percent of U.S.
levels to 60–70 percent of US levels.3 In stark contrast to this rapid income convergence, the Latin
American countries have stagnated (Brazil and Mexico) or even fallen behind (Peru) in relative
terms. The recent performance of a set of middle-income countries in Asia lies somewhere between
the extremes of East Asia and Latin America. Therefore the policy challenge there is to ensure
that going forward the former trajectory is emulated, not the latter.
2GDP in constant 2005 international dollars is obtained from the Penn World Tables 7.1. In this section US$3000
is chosen as an illustrative threshold for middle-income countries; the next section will develop the definition of a
middle-income country more carefully.
3Hong Kong SAR and Singapore (and among Latin American countries, Argentina) are not shown in these charts
because they had already exceeded the threshold level of US$3000 per capita in 1960, when our time series begins.
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There seems to be a connection between experiencing a growth slowdown and falling into a middle-
income trap. Figure 2 shows the same data in log income terms, so that the slopes of the lines can
be read as growth rates. It appears that the Latin American countries generally grew at a fairly
brisk pace for two or more decades after attaining middle-income status. But there is a noticeable
slowdown after that, with correspondingly rapid divergence from the East Asian trajectory. In
order to look in greater depth into the drivers of growth slowdowns, Figures 3 and 4 decompose
GDP growth rates (in constant international dollars) into factor accumulation and TFP growth,
for different regional groupings.4 Steep falls in TFP growth appear to have played an important
role in past growth slowdowns across Latin America in the 1980s, with lower growth in physical
capital stocks also contributing (Figure 3). In contrast, the success stories of East Asia (and, much
more recently and thus far, China and India) are largely underpinned by robust TFP growth,
especially in China and Taiwan Province of China, where they accounted for more than half of all
GDP per capita growth (Figure 4).
4Physical capital stocks are calculated on the basis of the perpetual inventory method from the Penn World
Tables. A standard capital share of one-third is assumed (see Gollin, 2002; and Aiyar and Dalgaard, 2009 for
justification). Human capital is calculated as a weighted average of years of primary schooling, years of secondary
schooling and years of higher schooling from the Barro-Lee dataset, with the weights comprising Mincerian coeffi-
cients obtained by Psacharopuolos (1994). The original idea that this is the appropriate way to introduce human
capital into an aggregate production function comes from Bils and Klenow (2000). Here we follow the lead of several
papers (Hall and Jones (1999); Aiyar and Dalgaard (2005); Duval and Maisonneuve (2010)) in assuming a piecewise
linear formulation for the log of human capital per capita, with the coefficients taken from Psacharopoulos (1994).
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3 Are Middle-Income Countries at Greater Risk of Sustained
Growth Slowdowns?
3.1 Identifying Growth Slowdowns
The literature on growth slowdowns has mainly focused on using statistical techniques to identify
turning points in the growth series of a sample of countries, or applying intuitive rules of thumb.
As an example of the former, Ben-David and Papell (1998) examine a sample of 74 advanced and
developing economies over several decades and look for statistically significant breaks in time series
of GDP growth rates. More recently, Berg, Ostry and Zettlemeyer (2012) identify growth spells
by employing and extending an algorithm suggested by Bai-Perron (2003).
As an example of the rules of thumb approach, Hausmann, Rodriguez, and Wagner (2006) develop
a rule of thumb for identifying “growth collapses,” which are defined as episodes which start with
a contraction in output per worker and end when the value immediately preceding the decline is
attained again. Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2011), define a growth slowdown episode as one in
which three conditions are satisfied: (i) growth in the preceding period is greater than or equal to
3.5 percent per annum; (ii) the difference in growth between the current and preceding period is
greater than or equal to 2 percentage points per annum; and (iii) the country’s per capita income
exceeds US$10,000 in 2005 constant international prices. This work, in turn, is symmetrically
based on Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik’s (2005) analysis of growth accelerations.
This study adopts an alternative approach, one that is better grounded in growth theory. The
standard Solow model with identical rates of savings, population growth, depreciation and tech-
nological change across countries predicts that poor countries will grow faster than rich coun-
tries. Conditional convergence frameworks emphasize that these parameters, and other variables
that might influence the steady state, are likely to differ across economies, thus implying that
different economies converge to different steady states. Nonetheless, conditional on these country-
specific factors, economies further away from the world technology frontier should grow faster than
economies close to the frontier. Our approach is to operationalize these strong predictions from
basic growth theory, and identify slowdowns in terms of large sudden and sustained deviations
from the predicted growth path.
We use annual data on per capita income in constant 2005 international dollars to compute a five
year panel of GDP per capita growth rates.5 The sample covers 138 countries over 12 periods
(1955–2009). Our specification is parsimonious: per capita GDP growth is regressed on the lagged
income level and standard measures of physical and human capital.6 For any country at any given
5We use five-year rolling geometric averages.
6This represents the most parsimonious established framework for conditional convergence using panel data. It
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point in time, the estimated relationship yields a predicted rate of growth, conditional on its level
of income and factor endowments.
Define residuals as actual rates of growth minus estimated rates of growth. A positive residual
means that the country is growing faster than expected, while a negative residual means the reverse.
Then country i is identified as experiencing a growth slowdown in period t if the two following
conditions hold:
resit − resit−1 < p(0.20) (1)
resit+1 − resit−1 < p(0.20) (2)
Here p (0.20) denotes the 20th percentile of the empirical distribution of differences in residuals
from one time period to another. Intuitively, condition (1) says that between period t-1 and t the
country’s residual became much smaller, that is, its performance relative to the expected pattern
deteriorated substantially. To be precise, the deterioration was sufficiently pronounced to place
the country-period observation in the bottom quintile of changes in the residual between successive
time periods. The second condition is meant to rule out episodes where growth slows down in the
current period only to recover in the next, by examining the difference in residuals between periods
t-1 and t+1, that is, over a ten year period.7 We are interested here in countries which experience
a sustained slowdown.
This methodology has at least three desirable characteristics. First, it makes precise the relative
nature of growth slowdowns. At different points in time, the neo-classical growth framework
predicts different growth rates for different countries conditional on world technology, current
income and factor endowments. By identifying growth slowdowns relative to these factors, and
also relative to other economies, the methodology takes theory seriously. Second, and relatedly,
it clarifies what needs to be explained. A slowdown in the headline rate of growth could occur,
for example, because the country has already attained a high level of income, or because of a
temporary shock. But neither of these phenomena stand in need of explanation. Our proposed
methodology demarcates those countries which are growing slowly after accounting for expected
income convergence and after accounting for short-lived shocks. Finally, the methodology appears
also allows a sharper focus on TFP; what we describe as growth slowdowns in this paper may alternatively be
characterized as TFP slowdowns. The rate of investment in physical capital is taken from the Penn World Tables.
The rate of investment in human capital across countries is unavailable, so we follow the standard practice of using
the stock of human capital instead (e.g., Islam, 1995; Caselli, Esquivel, and Lefort, 1996), calculated using the
methodology described in the previous section. Full results are available from the authors on request.
7Note that these conditions imply that we cannot identify slowdowns in our sample’s initial period (1955–60),
because there is no prior period for comparison, nor in the final period (2005–09), because there is no subsequent
period for comparison.
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to pass the “smell test.” In particular, it captures the episodes that motivated this study, that
is, substantial growth slowdown episodes in Latin America in the 1980’s and some slowdowns in
Asian countries in the late 1990’s (for the comprehensive list of all country-periods identified as
slowdowns by our methodology, see Aiyar and others, 2013).
A variant of our specification in which the initial panel regression excludes factors of production
as regressors, retaining only the initial level of income (absolute convergence), yields a rather
similar set of slowdown episodes (the correlation coefficient is 0.97). This implies that the results
from this paper are not sensitive to the particular form of conditional convergence assumed above.
It also suggests, as already flagged above, that when it comes to sustained shifts away from the
convergence path, growth slowdowns are almost synonymous with TFP slowdowns. However, both
the conditional and absolute convergence frameworks differ markedly from Eichengreen, Park, and
Shin (2011). The latter study, for example, does not capture the widespread slowdown across Latin
America in the 1980s, perhaps because of its narrower focus on countries which already had already
attained a per capita income of US$ 10,000 in 2005 international dollars. In fact most countries
identified in that paper are developed and oil exporting countries. Our methodology focuses instead
on slowdowns at all income levels relative to the predictions of growth theory, allowing us to ask
in a second stage whether slowdowns are empirically more prevalent in middle-income countries.
Tables 1 and 2 below summarize the slowdown variable created using this identification scheme,
breaking down episodes by region and time period. Out of the 1125 observations collected in the
dataset, the algorithm in (1)-(2) selects 123 slowdowns, that is, around 11 percent of the overall
sample. Two important stylized facts stand out. First, the regional frequency of past episodes—
measured as the ratio of slowdown episodes to overall number of observations in the region— was
significantly higher in developing regions, in particular Latin America, Middle East, North Africa,
sub-Saharan Africa, and East Asia (Table 1). It was also higher in some developing regions than
in others. Second, the frequency of experiencing a slowdown differed from period to period (Table
2). In particular, the frequency of slowdowns was higher than average over 1975–85, and rather
low during 1960–65.
Table 1: Distribution of Slowdown Episodes by Region
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Table 2: Distribution of Slowdown Episodes by Time Period
3.2 Are Middle-Income Countries at Greater Risk?
We are now able to ask: does the Middle Income Trap exist? That is, are countries that have
attained middle-income status more likely to experience slowdowns than low-income and high-
income countries? Because there is no commonly agreed definition of what constitutes “middle-
income,” we analyze this question over a range of possible lower and upper thresholds for middle
income status. We start by defining sets of GDP per capita (in 2005 PPP $) thresholds. Each
set i is composed of two thresholds t1i and t2i where t1i < t2i and where t1 is the threshold that
separates low-income from middle-income and t2 is the threshold that separates middle-income
from high-income. We assume t1 can take three values, namely 1000, 2000 and 3000 (2005 PPP $)
while possible values for t2 range from 12,000 up to 16,000 (in increments of 1000). Using this set
of values generates 15 classifications (3×5) spanning a wide range of potential definitions. Figure
5 summarizes the results by plotting, within each income category, the ratio of slowdown episodes
to total observations.
Figure 5 makes clear that middle-income countries are disproportionately likely to experience
growth slowdowns, and this result is robust to a wide range of income thresholds for defining
“middle income.” In our sample, the relative frequency of slowdown episodes for the middle-income
category is always significantly higher than for the other two income categories. For the remainder
of this paper, when referring to income categories, we will adopt the 2/15 definition, that is, a
threshold for low-income economies of 2000 constant (2005 PPP $) dollars and a threshold for
high-income economies of 15,000 dollars. The main reason for this choice is that the GDP per
capita classification generated by these particular cut-off points is extremely close to the GNI per
capita classification employed by the World Bank.8 Empirical results are robust to the use of
neighboring thresholds instead.
8The most recent World Bank classification with data for 2010 is very similar to the classification yielded by our
2/15 GDP per capita rule. Actually, there is an overlap of 97 percent between the two methodologies; only eight
countries are classified differently.
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4 What Drives Sustained Growth Slowdowns?
4.1 Empirical Strategy
Having identified growth slowdowns, we now turn to studying their determinants and how they
may differ between middle-income and other countries. The basic strategy is to estimate the impact
of various determinants on the probability of a country experiencing a slowdown in a particular
period using probit specifications. The main challenge—customary in growth empirics—is that
the ex ante set of potential determinants is very large. Like growth itself, growth slowdowns could
in principle be generated by a host of factors. Favorable demographics could accelerate growth
(reducing the probability of a slowdown), while unfavorable demographics could depress it. Poor
institutions—and there are many different types of relevant institutions—could deter innovation,
hamper the efficiency of resource allocation, and reduce the returns to entrepreneurship. Structural
characteristics of the economy, outward orientation, the state of infrastructure, financial depth, and
labor market characteristics could exercise independent effects on growth. And macroeconomic
developments, such as terms of trade movements or asset price cycles, could also change the
probability of a sustained growth slowdown. Furthermore, as noted above there is virtually no
theory about why and how middle-income economies may be different.
Rather than developing a restrictive theory of growth slowdowns and testing it, this paper follows a
strand of recent growth literature in being agnostic about the causes of slowdowns. In what follows
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we consider as broad a range of factors as possible, culled from a wide reading of the empirical
growth literature.9 The set of regressors comprises 42 explanatory variables grouped into seven
categories (for some justification of their presence and discussion of their expected effects based on
the theoretical and empirical growth literature, as well as for details on variable units and sources,
see Aiyar and others, 2013):
i) Institutions
We use five institutional variables in this category, four of which are drawn from the Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) database compiled by the Simon Fraser Institute. The Size of
Government index measures the extent of government involvement in the economy, using a range
of measures such as general government consumption spending, investment, subsidies and transfers
as a percentage of GDP, government ownership of enterprises, and the top marginal income tax
rate. The Rule of Law index combines indicators of judicial independence, contract enforcement,
military interference in the rule of law, the protection of property rights, and regulatory restrictions
on the sale of real property. Freedom to Trade Internationally is constructed from measures of
trade taxes, nontariff trade barriers, black market exchange rates and international capital market
controls. The Regulation index is an average of sub-indices measuring credit market, labor market
and business regulations. The fifth variable used here is the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness
(Chinn and Ito, 2006).
ii) Demography
The three variables considered are the Fertility Rate (average number of births per woman), the
Dependency Ratio (ratio of children and old people to people of working age) and the Sex Ratio
(ratio of men to women, interpreted as a measure of gender bias in the literature).
iii) Infrastructure
We study three kinds of infrastructure development that have been viewed as important by the
literature, using data taken from Calderon and Serven (2004). Telephone Lines is the log of
telephone lines per 1000 people. Power is the log of gigawatts of generating capacity per 1000
people. And Roads is the log of the length of the country’s road network per square kilometer of
land area.
iv) Macroeconomic environment and policies
A large variety of macroeconomic factors that have been associated with growth or shocks to
growth in the literature are considered, namely Inflation, Gross Capital Inflows (as a share of
GDP), Public Debt (also as a share of GDP), Trade Openness (a country’s exports plus imports
9A few variables that have featured prominently in the growth literature, such as R&D spending, could not be
included here for lack of data spanning a reasonable number of countries and decades.
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divided by GDP), Terms of Trade and the occurrence of Banking Crises (a dummy variable taking
value one if the country experienced a banking crisis in any of the five years preceding the current
year). Four variables Oil Exporters’ Price Shock, Food Exporters’ Price Shock, Oil Importers’
Price Shock, and Food Importers’ Price Shock are also included in case the data reveals anything
specific about commodity price shocks in countries that are heavily reliant on commodity exports
or imports (that is, an effect above and beyond that captured by levels and differences of the
country’s Terms of Trade). For instance, Oil Exporter’s Price Shock is defined as the change in
the world oil price over the current period times the share of oil exports as percent of GDP. The
other three variables are defined analogously, replacing oil by food and exports with imports when
relevant.
v) Economic structure
This category features two broad types of variables: (i) GDP Share of Agriculture and GDP
Share of Services (with the residual manufacturing share omitted), so as to test whether and how
structural transformation of the economy may affect the likelihood of a sustained growth slowdown;
(ii) Papageorgiou and Spatafora’s (2012) index of (lack of) Output Diversification across (twelve)
sectors, which however has to be studied separately and yields only tentative results as it is available
only from 2000 onwards.
vi) Trade structure
Two dimensions are captured here, namely: (i) how unfavorable a country’s geographical location
is, measured by a Distance variable which for each country i sums the distance to every other
country in the world j, weighting each distance by the share of country j in world GDP; (ii)
Regional Integration is the amount of intra-regional trade (exports plus imports) undertaken by a
country relative to its total trade; (iii) (Lack of) Export Diversification is a Theil index calculated
by Papageorgiou and Spatafora (2012) using product data at the four-digit SITC level.
vii) Other
In this last module we consider variables that do not fit easily under any of the previous economic
categories. ELF is an index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, which has often been associated
with poor social capital and negative growth outcomes (Easterly and Levine, 1997; and La Porta
and others, 1999). Tropics measure the fraction of a country’s land area that lies in the tropical
zone. Various features of this climatic zone, such as poorer land productivity and conditions more
favorable to vector-borne diseases could have an adverse impact on growth (Sachs and Warner,
1997; and Masters and McMillan, 2001). Being a Spanish Colony in the past and having a large
Buddhist population are variables that Sala-i-Martin, Dopplehofer, and Miller (2004) find to be sig-
nificantly associated with growth even after controlling for other institutional and cultural factors.
Finally, Wars and Civil Conflicts, and Natural Disasters can clearly depress growth.
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The actual number of right-hand-side (RHS) variables used is larger still because, as a general rule,
we allow the data to speak to whether these variables influence slowdown probabilities in levels
or differences. That is, the initial level (at the beginning of the period) and lagged difference of
each variable both appear as regressors. Because of the focus on the determinants of sustained
slowdowns, one would expect the explanatory variables to matter mostly in differences. However,
in some cases the level may pick up important threshold effects, for example some institutional
settings may become binding constraints and increase the likelihood of a growth slowdown once
an economy has reached middle-income status.
The inclusion of a large number of potential regressors, however, has two important drawbacks:
model uncertainty and data availability. The first, model uncertainty, is a standard issue in growth
empirics where ignorance of the “true” model tends to inflate the number of variables on the RHS
or cast doubt on those selected arbitrarily. Classical estimation methods can be of limited use in
sorting out robust correlates from irrelevant variables, and growth regressions tend to generate un-
stable, and sometimes contradictory results (Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Tan, 2008). Our approach to
address model uncertainty is to employ Bayesian model averaging techniques. More precisely, after
every probit estimation (which is used to generate the main results), two Bayesian model-averaging
techniques are applied to the corresponding linear probability model to assess the robustness of the
results: the Weighted Average Least Squares (WALS) methodology developed by Magnus, Powell,
and Prüfer (2010) and the more standard Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) developed by Leamer
(1978) and popularized by Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhoffer and Miller (2004). A technical description
of the two methods is provided in Aiyar and others (2013).
The growth literature has seen increasing use of Bayesian averaging techniques, in particular the
BMA.10 But WALS is substantially faster than BMA routines. In particular, the computing time
increases only linearly with the number of variables using the WALS procedure, while it increases
exponentially using BMA. Given the number of regressions and variables considered in this paper,
this computational advantage is not negligible. Moreover, WALS relies on a more transparent
treatment of ignorance in the form of a Laplace distribution for the parameters and a different
scaling parameter for the prior variance.11 Contrasting the two methods allows us to check that our
results are robust to changes in the Bayesian averaging method. As regards the growth literature,
Magnus, Powell, and Prüfer (2010) have recently shown that some conclusions from Sala-i-Martin,
Doppelhoffer, and Miller (2004) were not confirmed by the WALS method, implying that even
slight changes to priors and distributions could lead to different diagnosis. As we shall see, it turns
out that an overwhelming majority of results are confirmed by both methods. This increases our
confidence in the robustness of the conclusions.
10See Moral-Benito (2011) for a survey.
11The use of a Laplace distribution rather than a normal distribution also leads to finite risk. For a detailed
treatment of the conceptual differences between BMA and WALS, see Magnus, Powell, and Prüfer (2010).
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The second drawback of considering many potential explanatory variables is that of data avail-
ability. Working on 138 countries over 60 years implies inevitable data gaps. In particular, even
though the LHS variable consists of 1125 observations with 123 slowdown episodes, data gaps in
the RHS variables can restrict drastically the actual sample used for estimation. At one extreme,
if one were to use all the 42 explanatory variables in a single estimation at the same time, the
actual sample size would drop to less than 170 observations (and 18 slowdowns) due to the poor
overlap between the different data categories outlined above. More importantly, using only these
170 observations would imply losing almost all observations before 1995 and observations covering
developing countries, thereby restricting the analysis only to recent slowdown episodes that took
place in advanced economies. To address at least in part this issue, we group the potential explana-
tory variables into seven categories and estimate their impact on slowdowns separately.12 With
relatively large sample sizes within each grouped specification, we can then better discriminate
between alternative variables falling into a given category (e.g., institutions).
Although considering all right-hand side variables in a single estimation restricts drastically the
sample to about 200 observations, as an additional robustness check we perform a comprehen-
sive Bayesian averaging exercise using all variables (with the exception of output diversification
measures for lack of long time series). For (computational) simplicity, we restrict attention to
the WALS framework. The results from the categorical approach that will be reported below are
essentially confirmed —somewhat surprisingly so, given small sample size; in particular, virtually
all the institutional, demographic, trade structure, infrastructure and macroeconomic environment
variables found to be highly significant in the category-by-category approach remain significant
when considered altogether.13
To summarize, our empirical procedure adopted proceeds through the following two steps. In step
1, for each category, we start by running probit specifications with lagged level and differenced
values of all possible explanatory variables within the specific economic category. Thus, within the
“institutions” category, for a slowdown episode over 1975-80, the 1975 level of each institutional
variable is used together with the change in that variable between 1970 and 1975. This approach
minimizes possible endogeneity issues. We use both backward and forward selection procedures to
identify a restricted set of robust regressors.14 In step 2, to assess the robustness of the preferred
probit specification used in step 1, Bayesian averaging techniques (BMA and WALS) are used
over the full set of variables within the economic category of interest. As a third step (unreported
12A similar categorization strategy is followed in Berg, Ostry and Zettlemeyer (2012)
13By contrast, output composition measures, as well variables reported in the “other” category, tend to lose sig-
nificance. This likely reflects the impact of the exercise on sample composition. Using only 200 observations implies
losing almost all observations before the 1990s as well as those covering low-income countries, thereby restricting
attention to recent slowdowns in more advanced countries. This, in particular, might explain the insignificance of
variables (in the “other” category) such as war, civil conflicts or natural disasters.
14Whenever the set of variables identified as significant differs between procedures, we consider the bigger set. In
general, there happens to be excellent agreement between the forward and backward procedures.
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below), we also perform a comprehensive (WALS) Bayesian averaging exercise using all variables
that confirms our main results.
4.2 The key drivers of sustained growth slowdowns
As an illustration, results for the institutional variables category are reported in Table 3. The
first panel presents coefficient estimates and p-values for those variables found to be significant in
the “best” probit specification, that is, the probit including variables selected in Step 1 above. In
this case, the forward and backward selection procedures agree exactly on the significance of three
variables. The level of Rule of Law is significant at the 1 percent level: good legal systems, contract
enforcement and property rights are strongly associated with a reduced probability of a growth
slowdown episode. The Size of Government and Regulation indices are also highly significant but
in differences: a country that reduces government involvement in the economy and deregulates its
labor, product and credit markets is less likely to slow down in the subsequent period.
The second panel shows results from Bayesian model averaging for the complete set of explanatory
variables, i.e. the output of Step 2 under the form of individual PIPs (for BMA) and t-ratios (for
WALS). The BMA column reports posterior inclusion probabilities (PIP): the sum of the posterior
probabilities of all the regressions including that variable. Computationally, it is a weighted average
of the goodness-of-fit of models including a particular variable, relative to models not including
that variable. Magnus, Powell, and Prüfer (2010), as well as Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008),
suggest a PIP threshold of 0.5 for inclusion of a variable whereas, in the case of WALS, a t-ratio
with an absolute value of 1 or greater is typically recommended as a threshold for significance.15
Using these criteria, both WALS and BMA find that the level of the Legal Structure and the lagged
change in Size of Government and Regulation are robust correlates of growth slowdowns. In other
words, both Bayesian techniques confirm the significance of variables identified using the probit
analysis.
Table 4 presents a summary of all key results across all seven categories. It lists, by module, all
the variables found selected as significant. Apart from showing the average marginal effect of each
variable, it attempts to give a flavor of the magnitude of their impact on slowdown probabilities, as
well as on possible asymmetries in this impact arising from the distributional characteristics of the
variable. The last two columns of the table show the impact on the probability of a slowdown if
15In a nutshell, the intuitions are the following. In the BMA case, a standard procedure is to assume that every
possible model has the same chance of being selected. In such case, the prior probability of including any regressor
to be selected ex-ante is 0.5, and there is support for including the variable considered if the PIP rises above the
prior inclusion probability after computation of the model. In the WALS case, including a particular variable implies
an increase in model fit (as measure by the adjusted R2) if and only if the t ratio of the additional regressor, in
absolute value, is greater than 1 (Magnus, Powell, and Prüfer, 2010).
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Table 3: Full Results for the category Institutions
variable X moves from the 25th percentile of the distribution of X to the 75th percentile (integrating
over all possible values for other variables in the module). The key findings are the following:
i) Institutions. See above.
ii) Demographics. A high ratio of dependants to workers, and an increase in the ratio of men to
women both increase the probability of a growth slowdown in the subsequent period.
iii) Infrastructure. No robust results could be found, an issue we come back to below.
iv) Macroeconomic environment and policies. The initial level of Gross Capital Inflows / GDP
is associated with a higher probability of growth slowdown. This is consistent with a “sudden
stop” story, as also suggested by the result on first differences—a reduction in inflows is also
associated with a higher probability of slowdown in the subsequent period. Domestic overheating
also seems to matter, thus a rapid increase in an economy’s Investment Share is strongly related
to the slowdown probability of the subsesubsequent period. Finally, economies which increase
their Trade Openness become less vulnerable to a subsequent slowdown, possibly because trade
represents a diversification from purely domestic risks to a mix between domestic and external
risks, thereby offering insurance against idiosyncratic domestic shocks.16
v) Economic structure. A lower initial share of value added in agriculture and services, and a
shrinking share of value added in those sectors, are associated with a higher probability of a
16Another finding is that an increase in the Public Debt / GDP ratio is associated with a smaller slowdown
probability. However, we do not report this (prima facie counterintuitive) result in Table 4 as further analysis shows
that it is fully driven by a set of countries whose debts were forgiven as part of the HIPC initiative (and hence
registered rapid debt reduction) but which registered poor economic performance.
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growth slowdown. The most natural interpretation is that economies undergoing rapid structural
change face a concomitant risk of slowdowns. During the process of economic development, surplus
labor typically moves from the agricultural and (informal) services sector to formal employment in
the newly expanding industrial sector. Agriculture and services shrink in relative terms, industry
expands, and modern economic growth ensues. But this beneficial process creates concomitant
risks of a growth slowdown.
Separately, we find support for the thesis that sectoral diversification is associated with a lower
probability of growth slowdowns. This could simply reflect the relationship between diversification
and growth documented by the literature, or the fact that diversification is a form of insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks to a particular sector that in a concentrated economy could lead to
slowdown and stagnation. vi) Trade structure. The smaller the (GDP-weighted) Distance of a
country from potential trade partners, and the greater its share of intra-regional trade, the less
likely is a slowdown. Proximity to world and regional economic centers may be conducive to sus-
tained growth through expanded trade opportunities and scale economies (Redding and Venables,
2004)—as well as though better opportunities for foreign investment and knowledge spillovers.
Export Diversification is not selected as significant, but a closer analysis shows that introduc-
ing Export Diversification in tandem with Distance and Regional Integration results in “throwing
away” a considerable amount of data on diversification because of limited sample coverage for the
other two variables. Worse, the omitted data is disproportionately from African countries, which
may stand to benefit the most from diversification if the relationship between diversification and
growth is non-linear. When estimating the relationship between growth slowdowns and Export
Diversification separately, we find that a diversified export base is indeed associated with a lower
probability of slowdown for the larger sample.
vii) Other. Finally, Wars and Civil Conflicts and the fraction of a country’s area in the Tropics
raise the probability of a growth slowdown in the next period.
Some of the variables amenable to policy are estimated to have a substantial impact on slowdown
probabilities. For example, taken at face value, the results imply that improving trade integration
from the 25th percentile level to the median lowers the probability of a slowdown by 2.5 percent-
age points, while a further move to the 75th percentile lowers that probability by a further 3.4
percentage points.
4.3 Are Middle-Income Countries Different?
Since we have already established that middle-income countries (MICs) differ from others in ex-
periencing a higher frequency of slowdowns, it is natural to ask whether any of the determinants
examined above act on MICs differently. To explore this possibility we restrict the sample to
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Table 4: Full results
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MICs and repeat all the regressions described in the previous subsections. Table 5 shows how the
results differ across the full sample and the restricted sample. A blank entry in the MIC column
indicates implies that the variable is not selected as significant in the restricted sample despite
being significant in the full sample. A blank entry in the full sample column implies the reverse.
Two points are worth noting with respect to institutions. First, Government Size replaces the Rule
of Law as the most significant institution variable in levels. It may be that at very low levels of
income, the development of a basic framework of property rights and contract enforcement has a
large impact in staving off slowdowns, but once this condition is more or less satisfied the capacity
of the private sector to grow and innovate becomes relatively more important. The capacity of
the private sector to expand may be hampered by the extent of government involvement in the
economy, which therefore shows up as significant for MICs. Related to this, the coefficient on
Regulation in differences is twice as large for MICs than for the full sample of countries, suggesting
again that deregulation is a particularly important channel for guarding against slowdowns in
MICs. This is consistent with Aghion and others’ (2005) emphasis on distance-to-frontier effects:
the marginal impact of regulation is likely to be greater closer to the world technology frontier,
where the key to productivity gains lies in innovation rather than absorption of existing technology.
Second, the level of infrastructure development is important in MICs, where insufficient Road
Networks and Telephone Lines per head both emerge as potential risk factors for growth. In line
with some of the results on institutions, infrastructure development appears to matter more once
the low-income stage of development has been passed.
On trade, it should be stressed that the result that Regional Integration reduces the probability
of a slowdown is obtained for MICs only after dropping outliers. That is, the reported coefficient
is for a sample of MICs in which the bottom and top deciles—by degree of regional trade integra-
tion—have been excluded. Including these outliers drives the significance of the relationship below
conventional limits. This suggests threshold effects: a marginal increase in regional integration has
little effect if the country is initially very poorly integrated or very highly integrated.17
Finally, the tentative finding that both Output Diversification and Trade Diversification are neg-
atively associated with the probability of a slowdown disappears when the sample is restricted to
MICs. This is consistent with the literature emphasizing that diversification is particularly asso-
ciated with economic growth in low-income countries transitioning out of a primarily agriculture-
based economy, and that the relationship might even reverse beyond a certain level of income
(Papageorgiou and Spatafora, 2012; Imbs and Wacziarg , 2003).
17It is possible that regional integration, especially the way it is measured in this study, is related to product
sophistication. For example, if an economy that was initially exporting mainly resource-based commodities begins
to integrate into regional vertical supply chains, that would tend to increase both regional integration as well as
product sophistication. But data coverage is much better for regional integration than for product sophistication.
This does not imply, of course, that the result for regional integration is spurious; merely that one of the reasons
why it matters is that it spurs product sophistication.
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Table 5: MICs vs Full Sample
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5 Policy conclusions and implications for fast-growing Asian
economies
The chief policy implications lie in the variables identified as significant in the previous section.
They are hardly controversial, but they do provide intellectual ballast for supportive reforms in
areas identified as important, and for a more detailed academic focus and further research in those
areas.18 Moreover, some of the identified variables are clearly more amenable to policy than others,
especially over short time horizons. Prudential regulation to limit the build-up of excessive capital
inflows and cushion the impact of a sudden stop, measures to enhance regional trade integration,
public investment in infrastructure projects, and deregulation in areas where red tape is stifling
private activity are all examples of reforms that can be enacted by incumbent governments in
a relatively short period of time. At the other extreme, a country’s geographical distance from
potentially attractive trade partners, and its climatic conditions are essentially immune to policy.
In between there are variables that could be influenced by policy but only over the medium- to
long-term, such as demographic trends (e.g., through incentives to reduce fertility and combat
gender discrimination) and the rule of law.
Table 6 below constructs an illustrative “growth slowdown risk” map for six Asian MICs in seven
categories identified in the previous section. In each category we apply the MIC coefficients listed
in Table 5 to the latest available data for the Asian MICs, to calculate the probability of an
imminent slowdown over the next five years.19 Then we look at the rankings of the six Asian
MICs under each category, with one signifying the greatest risk of slowdown in that category and
seven signifying the least risk. The red color indicates lower (“bad”) rankings while the green color
denotes higher (“good”) ones, relative to other economies featured in the table.
Taken at face value, the empirical results imply that, compared with other Asian economies,
Malaysia and China would face a larger risk of growth slowdown stemming from institutions. India
and Indonesia are most at risk of a slowdown arising from a lack of transport and communications
infrastructure. On trade, India could do more to pursue regional integration, while Thailand
and the Philippines are relatively well integrated. It should be stressed that Table 6 does not
rank countries according to the levels of the underlying variables, but instead according to the
(weighted) mix of levels and differences that came out significant in the empirical analysis. For
18For example, one issue that this paper has not taken up is whether the impact of distance to frontier on economic
growth – and, by extension, on the probability of a slowdown – is itself a function of time. It may be argued that
technology is more easily disseminated today, with greater stocks of FDI or widespread internet connectivity, than
in earlier periods of time. Another issue that might benefit from further research is the time-varying role of TFP
in MICs; it is possible that once these countries have exhausted the “spurt” from the accumulation of factors of
production, they must rely increasingly on productivity gains to engender further growth.
19We omit the category “Other” from the previous section, covering variables largely irrelevant from a policy
perspective. The category “Infrastructure” is split into two columns, Communications and Road transport, because
probit specifications for these variables are run separately due to their strong correlation.
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Table 6: A “Growth Slowdown Risk Map” for Asian Middle-Income Countries
instance, the higher risk of slowdown arising from institutions in Malaysia than in China does not
mean that the latter has “better” institutions than the former but rather that its institutions have
improved more rapidly over the last period of the sample—since it is the difference that is found
to matter for two out of the three statistically significant institutional variables in the regression
analysis, see Table 4.
Finally, Figures 6 and 7 perform similar comparisons, but now focusing only on the levels of the
variables. The purpose here is to identify each country’s current relative strengths and weaknesses,
and thereby to determine where it has most room for reducing risks of a sustained growth slowdown
at some point in the future. This approach implies some departure from—although it remains
qualitatively consistent with—the empirical analysis, since as noted above the latter identifies a
mix of levels and differences as drivers of slowdown probabilities. For simplicity and illustrative
purposes, in Figures 6 and 7 rankings in each category are computed here as simple averages of
the rankings on the variables belonging to this category, and only a subset of those variables is
considered. The results are shown in the form of “spider webs:” the larger the area within each
country’s “spider web,” the better its current settings in the dimension considered.
The main findings from Figure 6 are largely consistent with those from Table 6, and Figure 7 offers
some insights into how Asian economies are on average positioned relative to middle-income peers
in other regions (Latin America and Middle-East North Africa). Compared with other MICs, Asia
compares rather favorably on average, but there is wide cross-country heterogeneity. Several coun-
tries in the region need to develop new infrastructure and upgrade existing infrastructure in power
generation, public transit systems, freight and ports. Asian MICs also show relative weaknesses on
institutions, with stringent product market regulations in a number of them (e.g. India, Indonesia)
remaining a risk factor. On macroeconomic factors, while Asia’s growth typically benefits from
its comparatively strong capital inflows and high investment rates, these also come with risks. On
other dimensions, they often compare favorably to their emerging market counterparts in other
regions, in particular in the trade category. Regional integration and vertical supply chains in
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Asian MICs compare favorably with Latin American and MENA comparators. Even India and
Indonesia, which lag behind the other Asian MICs in this category, are well situated compared to
the broader sample. So this is an area of strength, which should serve the region well as a buffer
against growth slowdowns.
Figure 6. Asian MICs’ Current Strengths and Weaknesses
Note: Institutions includes small government involvement in the economy, strong rule of law and light regulation; In-
frastructure includes telephone lines and road networks; Macroeconomic factors includes low gross capital inflows, low
investment-to-GDP ratio, and high trade openness; Trade structure includes strong regional integration and low GDP-
weighted distance. In each category, a simple average of the rankings along each individual variable is taken. We rely on
latest available observations on each individual variable, with the exception of dependency ratios for which projected 2020
values (as featured in the baseline United Nations population scenario) are considered.
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Figure 7: Asian MIC’s Current Strengths and Weaknesses Relative to Other
Emerging Regions
Note: Institutions includes small government involvement in the economy, strong rule of law and light regulation; In-
frastructure includes telephone lines and road networks; Macroeconomic factors includes low gross capital inflows, low
investment-to-GDP ratio, and high trade openness; Trade structure includes strong regional integration and low GDP-
weighted distance. In each category, a simple average of the rankings along each individual variable is taken. We rely on
latest available observations on each individual variable, with the exception of dependency ratios for which projected 2020
values (as featured in the baseline United Nations population scenario) are considered.
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Chapter 3 - Demand Recomposition and the
Distribution of Income
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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory explaining the cyclical properties of the income distribution.
We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model in which agents have non-homothetic
preferences and di↵er in terms of their initial ownership of capital. We show that when sectors
di↵er in terms of their relative labour- and capital-intensity, changes in the composition of
demand are an important channel through which productivity shocks are propagated through
the economy. We then use this framework to study the distributional consequences of aggregate
shocks. Consistent with empirical evidence, we find income inequality (as measured by the
Gini coe cient) to be counter-cyclical. This e↵ect is driven mostly by changes in the level
of employment, and to a lesser degree by changes in relative factor prices. We also find that
changes in the concentration of capital ownership have negligible e↵ects on both the level and
the cyclical properties of income inequality. [JEL codes: D31, D33, E24, J31]
1 Introduction
There is a long-standing tradition in economics studying the link between inequality and macroe-
conomic performance. For David Ricardo, understanding how economic output is divided among
the various classes of society constituted the “principal problem of Political Economy.” The neo-
classical representative-agent paradigm, however, has traditionally considered distributional issues
to be of second-order importance. This neglect has been partly addressed by several important
contributions, focusing on issues as varied as human capital accumulation Galor and Zeira (1993),
industrialisation Banerjee and Newman (1993), and international trade Matsuyama (2000). That
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would like to thank Piero Gottardi, Evi Pappa, Jenny Simon and Salvatore Morelli for their comments. We would
also like to thank participants at the EUI Microeconomics Working Group and the OFCE Workshop on Inequality
and Macroeconomic Performance for useful discussions. All remaining errors are ours.
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being said, most of this research has focused on explaining long-run trends in income inequality and
their consequences for economic development. Much less is known about the cyclical properties of
the income distribution.
A priori, the impact of the business cycle on inequality is unclear. While unemployment a↵ect-
ing low-income households should increase inequality, profits and the return to capital investment
also fall during recessions. Since the owners of the capital stock tend to be located at the top
of the income distribution, these forces should lead to a reduction in inequality. To date, most
empirical studies relying on micro datasets have found income inequality to be countercyclical, and
this e↵ect to be mainly driven by employment and wage dynamics a↵ecting low income households.
Taken together, these studies have highlighted the importance of labour dynamics - rather than
variations in capital income - in driving the income distribution in the short run. However, the un-
derlying economic mechanisms responsible for this empirical regularity remain largely unexplored.
The objective of this paper is to propose a novel theoretical framework that explains why income
inequality tends to be counter-cyclical.
Motivated by a series of new stylised facts, it first emphasises the importance of changes in
the composition of demand over the business cycle in understanding income dynamics. Using
US industry-level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) over the period 1977-2010,
Jin and Li (2012) find that labour-intensive sectors expand disproportionately more than capital-
intensive sectors during booms. As a result, the share of production, investment and employment
in capital-intensive sectors drops significantly during economic expansions, while the reverse tends
to happen during recessions. Using US household consumption data also drawn from the BEA,
we present new evidence showing that such pro-cyclicality of labour-intensive sectors is in part
attributable to a recomposition of private demand over the business cycle, rather than to industry-
specific productivity shocks. In particular, during recessions (booms), households tend to cut
(increase) spending disproportionately more on labour-intensive goods and services (such as houses,
motor vehicles or tourism), thereby generating high pro-cyclicality and volatility of employment
and output in labour-intensive industries.
Building on this empirical evidence, we develop a model to study how such changes in the
composition of demand a↵ect the distribution of income in the short run. We design a two-
sector general equilibrium model with labour market frictions in which the ownership of capital is
unequally distributed among the population and consumers have non-homothetic preferences. More
specifically, building on the hierarchic preferences developed by Matsuyama (2002), we assume that
consumers only begin to consume secondary goods (cars) after satiating their demand for more basic
goods (food). As we shall see, this implies that aggregate consumption shares vary with aggregate
income, and that aggregate productivity shocks a↵ect the allocation of capital across sectors. In
addition, and consistent with empirical evidence presented below, production technologies are such
that the factor share of capital is greater in sectors producing more ‘basic’ goods. Consequently,
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labour-intensive sectors are particularly sensitive to aggregate fluctuations and experience greater
volatility in output and employment.
This framework allows us to answer a number of interesting questions, including: what are
the distributional consequences of aggregate productivity shocks? what are the specific channels
driving the cyclical properties of the income distribution? and how do changes in the wealth
distribution a↵ect the income distribution in the short-run? The theoretical results we obtain go
a long way in rationalising a number of well-established and novel empirical facts. First, we find
the sectoral propagation of aggregate shocks to be driven by the reallocation of capital investment
across sectors. Second, the cyclical properties of the income distribution result from changes in the
level of employment, and to a lesser extent from changes in relative factor prices. This is consistent
with recent empirical studies which find that inequality rises during recessions because increases in
unemployment and lower wages worsen the relative position of low-income groups. Finally, we find
that the dynamics of the income distribution are essentially independent from the concentration
of wealth, a puzzle highlighted in Castaneda et al (1998) but which had yet to receive a clear
theoretical justification.
In order to gain some intuition about the underlying mechanics of the model, consider the
e↵ect of a standard productivity shock in an economic environment like the one described above.
Clearly, the first direct e↵ect will be a drop in aggregate output due to lower productivity. As
consumers have non-homothetic preferences, this drop in income will engender a recomposition
of demand away from secondary (labour-intensive) goods towards basic (capital-intensive) goods.
This demand composition e↵ect in turn will translate into a further fall in labour demand, over
and above that generated by the aggregate productivity shock itself. In a frictional labour market,
this factor demand e↵ect will result in an decrease in the level of equilibrium employment and
reduce wages, thereby worsening the relative position of lower quantiles. In order to study these
di↵erent e↵ects in detail, we proceed in three steps. First, we consider a Walrasian economy that
abstracts from the problem of unemployment in order to analytically characterise how changes
in the composition of demand a↵ect relative factor prices and the degree of income inequality.
Given the robust theoretical results we obtain from this benchmark economy, we then extend the
model and explicitly incorporate labour market frictions in order to study the e↵ects of unem-
ployment. Lastly, we perform some simple numerical exercises which allow us to decompose the
relative contribution of changing factor prices and employment rates, and study how changes in
the distribution of wealth a↵ect the cyclical movements of income inequality.
This paper builds on the theoretical literature studying how non-homothetic consumer prefer-
ences interact with income distribution e↵ects to explain the sectoral distribution of output and
employment. This literature has predominately focused on long-run macroeconomic performance;
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in particular, issues related to structural change, growth and the process of industrialisation.1
Murphy et al (1989) show how aggregate demand spill-overs and imperfectly competitive product
markets can rationalise Rosenstein-Rodan’s ‘big-push’ theory of industrialisation. In their model,
the distribution of income a↵ects the process of development via changes in the composition of de-
mand. This idea is further developed by Matsuyama (2002), who studies how demand composition
and income distribution e↵ects interact to explain the rise of ‘mass consumption’ societies. As in
this paper, a key assumption of Matsuyama’s model is that consumer preferences are hierarchic,
so that as households’ income increases, they expand the range of consumer goods they purchase
rather than purchasing greater quantities of the same goods. Among other things, this implies
that the market size for each consumption good does not depend only on the level of aggregate
income, but also on the distribution of income across households. A similar mechanism is studied
by Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006).
As mentioned above, while a considerable amount of work has been done studying how the
distribution of income and demand composition e↵ects interact to explain long-run structural
change, much less is known about their implications for short-run macroeconomic performance.
An important exception is the recent paper by Foellmi and Zweimuller (2011), who study how
inequality a↵ects the level of aggregate employment in an economy in which consumers have non-
homothetic preferences and product markets are monopolistically competitive. They consider a
model with only labour as a factor of production, and focus on labour income inequality (measured
in terms of heterogeneous labour endowments). Our paper, instead, considers a model with both
capital and labour as factors of production, and focuses on capital income inequality (measured
in terms of heterogeneous ownership shares of the capital stock). Importantly, the introduction of
an additional factor of production endogenises the income distribution through changes in relative
factor prices. This, in turn, allows us to explicitly address the counter-cyclical properties of the
income distribution, an issue which is markedly absent from Foellmi and Zweimuller’s analysis.
This paper is also naturally related to the literature studying the cyclical properties of the
income distribution. Lindquist (2004) studies the role played by capital-skill complementarity in
explaining the cyclical behaviour of wage inequality. His model successfully accounts for both
the volatility and the cyclical behaviour of the skill premium in the United States. While we
consider changes in the wage distribution to be an important component explaining the observed
movements of the overall income distribution, we do not explicitly account for these changes in this
paper. Contrary to this literature, the mechanism we develop does not rely on cyclical variations
in the skill premium, but rather only on the ex ante dispersion in capital ownership. Our analysis
should thus be thought as complementing the existing work done studying the cyclical properties
of wage inequality. Our paper is also closely related in spirit to Castaneda et al (1998), who build
1See Bertola (2000) for a survey of this literature.
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a model to explore to what extent unemployment spells and cyclically moving factor shares can
account for the counter-cyclical properties of the Gini coe cient. Their results indicate that: (i)
cyclically moving factor shares play a small role in explaining the counter-cyclicality of income
inequality; and (ii) the cyclical properties of the income distribution are essentially independent
from the wealth distribution. More specifically, they find that capital income fluctuations play a
small role in accounting for the counter-cyclicality of the Gini coe cient. The model we develop
below confirms this result, as we find that the cyclical properties of the income distribution are
primarily driven by changes in wages and the level of employment, and only marginally a↵ected
by changes in the distribution of capital ownership. What is more, we clearly identify the general
equilibrium e↵ects that explain why both the level and counter-cyclicality of income inequality are
largely independent of the concentration of wealth.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
relevant empirical evidence motivating our theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the model.
Section 4 solves for the equilibrium and examines its comparative static properties in the case
where the labour market is Walrasian. Section 5 introduces labour market frictions and studies
the e↵ects of variations in the level of employment. Numerical simulations are conducted in Section
6. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Empirical Motivation
In this section, we discuss the existing empirical evidence supporting the theoretical model devel-
oped below. The key empirical claims of the model can be summarised as follows:
1. The Gini coe cient for income is counter-cyclical, increasing during recessions and diminish-
ing during booms. This counter-cyclical property of income inequality is mainly driven by
employment and wage dynamics at the bottom of the distribution.
2. The relative position of low income groups varies along the cycle because labour-intensive
sectors are strongly pro-cyclical. In downturns (booms), households and firms tend to cut
(increase) the share of spending dedicated to labour intensive goods and services (e.g con-
struction, motor vehicles or tourism). Such recomposition of private demand generates high
pro-cyclicality and volatility of employment and output in labour-intensive industries.
To what extent are these claims supported by empirical evidence? Below, we provide a cursory
overview of existing empirical work suggesting that both claims are largely confirmed by the data.
We also bring new evidence supporting the demand composition e↵ect driving labour intensive
sectors’ volatility.
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Claim 1: Counter-Cyclical Gini Coe cient Drivers The counter-cyclical properties of
income inequality is now a well established empirical fact. In the case of the US, Castaneda et
al (1998) document the cyclical properties of income shares decomposed by quintile for the US
between 1948 and 1986 using Current Population Survey (CPS) data. The correlations, which
are reported in Table 1 below, show that the income share earned by the lowest quintile is both
the most volatile and the most pro-cyclical. Moreover, the pro-cyclicality of the income shares is
monotonically decreasing up to the fifth percentile. Using alternative income data from the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) between 1969 to 1981, Blank (1987) also confirms that the
income distribution narrows in times of economic expansion.2 More recently, Maestri and Roventini
(2012) generalise this finding by showing that almost all inequality series in OECD countries are
counter-cyclical at business cycle frequencies (with the important exception of Germany).
Correlation with Output Volatility
1st Quintile (0-20%) 0.53 1.07
2nd Quintile (20-40%) 0.49 0.48
3rd Quintile (40-60%) 0.31 0.26
4th Quintile (60-80%) -0.29 0.17
Next 15% (80-95%) -0.64 0.36
Top 5% (95-100%) 0.00 0.74
Table 1: Cyclical Behaviour of Income Share by Quintile for US 1948-1986.
Source: Castaneda et al (1998)
Claim 2: Pro-Cyclical Labour-Intensive Sectors Why is income inequality pro-cyclical?
Existing evidence clearly point to a strong e↵ect of both labour and wage dynamics a↵ecting low
income households. As put by Mocan (1999), citing several previous empirical studies, “the con-
sensus so far is that inequality rises during recessions because unemployment worsens the relative
position of low-income groups.” In addition to the employment e↵ect, the heterogeneous response
of labour earnings along the cycle seem to be an important source of variation: according to Blank
(1989), inequality tends to narrow in expansions because the cyclicality of household head’s labour
market income among low-income groups is very strong. Bonhomme and Huspido (2012) recently
illustrated the combined e↵ect of earnings and employment dynamics in driving income inequality
in Spain. Using information on labour earnings and employment from social security records be-
tween 1988 to 2010, the authors found that male earnings inequality was strongly countercyclical
over that period, and that this evolution went in parallel with the cyclicality of employment in the
lower-middle part of the wage distribution. Taken together, the existing literature therefore sug-
2Note that in the case of the US, Jonghyeon (2013) uses more recent CPS data and confirmed that income
inequality was countercyclical in the US between 1980 to 2004.
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gests that although unemployment and household earnings are pro-cyclical at each percentile of the
income distribution, business cycle fluctuations are more severe at the bottom of the distribution,
as documented by Heathcote et al (2010).
Figure 1: Correlation between the share of value added in capital-intensive sectors and GDP for
US 1977-2009. Source: Jin and Li (2012)
Figure 2: Correlation between the share of employment in capital-intensive sectors and GDP for
US 1977-2009. Source: Jin and Li (2012)
Although inequality dynamics in the short run are rather well documented, the underlying
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mechanism is not well understood. We first argue that wage and employment dynamics in the
lower part of the distribution occur because labour-intensive sectors are both more volatile and
more pro-cyclical than capital intensive sectors.3 Using US industry specific data on employment
and output in several advanced economies, Jin and Li (2012) showed that labour-intensive sectors’
output are significantly more volatile than that of capital-intensive sectors - more than twice as
volatile in the US and on average more than 60% as volatile among 12 OECD countries.4 Figures 1
and 2 above, taken from Jin and Li (2012), also emphasise the compositional change in US output
and employment over the business cycle. Both figures clearly show the counter-cyclicality of (de-
trended) output and employment shares of capital-intensive sectors. In particular, the correlation
of the share of value added in capital-intensive sectors with GDP is 0.87, while the correlation
of the share of employment in capital-intensive sectors with GDP is 0.58. This pattern is also
found to be robust across the majority of countries in the sample, with the average corresponding
correlation in a group of OECD countries being -0.53 and -0.63.
We argue that demand composition e↵ects drive the excessive volatility of labour intensive
sectors. Traditionally, heterogeneous responses to business cycle fluctuations at the sectoral level
have been though to result from sector-specific productivity shocks. Instead, we argue that such
sectoral dynamics reflect changes in the composition of aggregate demand, i.e. private consumption
and investment. Jin and Li (2012) also measure the (de-trended) share of investment in capital-
intensive sectors in total investment over the 1977 to 2009 period in the US. Their results indicate
that the correlation between the share of investment in capital-intensive sectors and output is -0.70.
The magnitude of this investment reallocation is also deemed to be economically significant as the
share of investment in capital-intensive sectors increases by about 5% during recessions.
Examining household consumption, we also find strong evidence that the composition of aggre-
gate consumption adjusts over the business cycle. Consumer spending in the US, as measured by
the BEA Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE), decreased in only four occasions over the last
30 years, namely during recessions in 1980, 1981/1982, 1991 and 2008/2009. Table 2 reports the re-
spective contributions to the change in PCE during these events, using quarterly data provided by
the BEA and distinguishing consumption by major type of product. Although the recessions were
di↵erent in nature and magnitude, it appears that important consumption adjustments were sys-
tematically made on outlays involving high labour intensity. For instance, recessions in 1980, 1982
3In their study using Spanish data, Bonhomme and Huspido (2012) suggested that the counter-cyclical behaviour
of inequality over the last cycle was related to changes in employment composition, in particular in favour of the
(labour intensive) construction sector. We show in fact that the pro-cyclicality of labour intensive industries is a
more general feature, i.e not limited to Spain over the last cycle.
4In the case of the US, these figures were generated with data taken from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) Industry Economic Accounts at the NAICS 2-4 digit level from 1977 to 2009. Statistics for OECD countries
are based on 2-3 digit ISIC level taken from the STAN database from 1992 to 2010. Capital shares at the industry
level were constructed as follows: (capital share) = 1 - (compensation of employees)/(value-added)-(taxes less
subsidies). Capital-intensive sectors are then defined as all sectors where the capital share is greater than the
median.
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Recession
Phase drop rebound drop rebound drop rebound drop rebound
Total PCE change (in%) -10,7 10,7 -4,4 5,4 -3 2,7 -9,3 9,8
of which
Durable Goods -4,6 3,7 -2,7 1,0 -3,7 1,6 -6,6 3,8
   Motor vehicles and parts -1,8 0,7 -2,6 0,8 -2,7 2,0 -4,1 2,2
   Furnishings and durable household equipment -1,4 0,9 -0,1 0,0 -0,5 -0,3 -1,1 0,5
   Recreational goods and vehicles -1,0 1,8 0,1 0,5 -0,3 -0,1 -0,7 0,8
   Other durable goods -0,5 0,3 -0,1 -0,2 -0,2 0,0 -0,8 0,3
Non-Durable Goods -3,2 2,5 -1,0 0,8 0,5 0,3 -1,8 0,2
   Food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption -1,0 0,7 -0,3 0,3 0,6 -0,1 0,2 -1,3
   Clothing and footwear -1,1 0,8 0,0 0,2 -0,1 0,3 -0,3 1,1
   Gasoline and other energy goods -0,2 0,0 -0,5 0,4 0,0 0,3 -1,4 -0,4
   Other nondurable goods -0,9 1,1 -0,2 -0,1 0,0 -0,2 -0,4 0,8
Services -2,9 4,5 -0,6 3,6 0,2 0,9 -1,0 5,8
   Housing and utilities 0,7 1,2 0,2 1,3 0,4 0,4 1,4 1,3
   Health care 1,3 1,2 0,1 0,7 -0,4 -0,3 -0,2 1,8
   Transportation services -1,4 -0,1 -0,6 -0,2 -0,2 -0,2 -0,9 -0,1
   Recreation services -0,7 0,3 -0,2 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,4
   Food services and accommodations -1,3 0,5 -0,6 0,5 -0,2 0,0 -0,6 0,5
   Financial services and insurance -0,7 0,7 1,3 1,0 0,2 0,4 -0,3 1,0
   Other services -1,0 0,7 -1,3 -0,2 0,0 0,2 -0,5 0,4
   Not reported (services) 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,5
2008 1991 1981/1982 1980
Table 2: PCE change decomposition during US recessions and recoveries, 1980-2010.
Source: BEA
Note: “Drop” periods are defined as the number of quarters during which the PCE fell below zero. “Rebound”
periods are defined as the (same) number of quarters following the drop period. Figures report the cumulative drop
(or increase) over a given period. As an example, the PCE fell below zero over 4 quarters in 2008/2009, for a total
cumulative drop of 10.7% (at annual rates). Therefore, the “rebound” column reports the cumulative increase in
PCE (or sub-category) over the 4 quarters following the drop period, i.e from 2009 Q2 to 2010 Q2.
and 1991 were mainly characterized by adjustments in durable goods consumption, in particular in
“Motor Vehicles and Parts” and to a lesser extent in “Furnishings and Durable Household Equip-
ments.” On the other hand, the 2008/2009 recession was not limited to durables and impacted
both non-durables (“Clothing and Footwear”) and Services (“Food services and Accommodation”
and “Transportation”). Following the methodology outlined in Jin and Li (2012), we find that
these goods and services all display very high labour intensity, ranging on average from 70.6% to
81.6% (see Table 3).
3 The Model
3.1 Environment
Preferences Consider an economy populated by a continuum of risk-neutral agents, indexed
by i 2 [0, 1]. We denote the set of agents by N = [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure N = 1. The
production-side of the economy consists of two sectors, one producing basic goods (food) and the
other producing secondary goods (cars). We index sectors by s 2 {1, 2}, and refer to sector 1 as
the basic good sector and sector 2 as the secondary good sector. Consumers are assumed to have
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Type of Goods/Services
in PCE
Underlying Industry Absolute Labour Intensity
Rank (among 61
sectors)
Motor Vehicles and
Parts
Motor vehicles, bodies
and trailers, and parts
81.6% 8th
Furnishings and
Durable household
equipments
Furniture and related
products
74.3% 19th
Clothing and Footwear
Apparel and leather
and allied products
75.3% 15th
Food Services and
Accomodation
Food services and
drinking places &
Accommodation
70.6% 18th & 32nd
Transportation
Air Transportation &
Rail Transportation
74.9% 10th & 23rd
Table 3: Labour intensity of the main underlying industry
Note: Because there is no direct equivalence between categories in the PCE and Industry-specific output tables used
to compute capital/labour intensity, the “underlying industry” column reports the equivalent or closest industry
among the 61 sectors listed in the NAICS 2-4 digit classification provided by the BEA.
identical non-homothetic preferences, implying that the bundle of goods they demand will depend
on their income. This non-homotheticity is captured by the hierarchic structure of consumer
preferences. Formally, we assume consumer preferences can be represented by the following utility
function
u(c1, c2) =
(
c1 if c1  c¯1
c¯1 + c2 if c1 = c¯1
where c¯1 > 0 denotes the satiation point for consumers’ demand of the basic good. The structure
of preferences implies that agents will only increase their consumption of the basic good until they
reach the satiation point. After this point, agents will continue to consume a fixed amount of the
basic good, and spend all additional income on the consumption of the secondary good.
Technology Production takes place using two factors of production: capital (K) and labour (L).
Importantly, we assume that the two factors of production are used in di↵erent intensities in the
two sectors. In line with the stylised facts presented above, we assume the secondary good sector
to be relatively labour intensive, while the basic good sector to be relatively capital intensive.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that production of the basic good requires only capital as
an input, while the production of the secondary good combines both factors of production using
a Cobb-Douglas production technology. Formally, the production technology in the basic good
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sector is given by
Y1(K1) = AK1
while the production technology in the secondary good sector is given by
Y2(K2, L2) = AK
↵
2 L
1 ↵
2
where ↵ 2 (0, 1) and A > 0 denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter5 We assume the capital
stock to be in fixed supply so that K1+K2 = K¯, where K¯ > 0 denotes the aggregate capital stock.
Endowments All agents are endowed with one unit of labour, but di↵er in terms of their own-
ership of the aggregate capital stock K¯. Formally, we assume that each agent is characterised by a
publicly observable type ✓i 2 ⇥ = [0, 1], where ✓i 2 [0, 1] denotes an agent’s ownership share of the
capital stock such that
R
i2N ✓idi = 1. Ownership shares are assumed to be continuously distributed
in the population according to the cumulative distribution function G : ⇥! [0, 1], with associated
probability density function g : ⇥ ! [0, 1]. By inverting the cumulative distribution function we
obtain the quantile function Q : N ! [0, 1] and associated quantile density function q : N ! [0, 1],
where Q(·) ⌘ G 1(·) and q(·) ⌘ Q0(·). Without loss of generality, we order agents by their own-
ership shares such that the index of agent i also denotes the Lebesgue measure of the set [0, i].
This implies that we can write ✓i = q(i), where by definition we must have
R 1
0 q(i)di = Q(1) = 1.
In order to measure the degree of wealth inequality, we define a scaling parameter   > 0 which
determines the statistical dispersion of the probability distribution G(✓; ). As   gets large, the
distribution of shares becomes increasingly unequal; as   goes to zero, the distribution of shares
becomes increasingly uniform.
Assumption 1: The distribution function G : ⇥ ! [0, 1] is such that the quantile density
function is continuously di↵erentiable and monotonically increasing such that q0(·) > 0.
3.2 Optimality Conditions
Utility Maximisation Taking the price of the secondary good as the numeraire so that p2 = 1,
we can write the budget constraint of agent i as follows
p1ci,1 + ci,2  Ii ⌘ wli + ✓irK¯, 8i 2 N
5The assumption that labour does not enter the production of basic goods is without loss of generality in the
sense that all results would hold even in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function
Y1(K1, L1) = K
 
1 L
1  
1
providing that   > ↵.
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where w > 0 and r > 0 denote the wage and interest rate, respectively. Note the since agents incur
no disutility from labour, we will have li = 1 8i 2 N in equilibrium. It follows that the aggregate
labour supply will be constant an equal to L¯ ⌘ Ri2N lidi = 1. We address the issue of equilibrium
unemployment in Section 5 below. The utility maximisation problem of consumers is then simply
given by
max
ci,1,ci,2
u(ci,1, ci,2) : p1ci,1 + ci,2  w + ✓irK¯
Given the hierarchic structure of consumer preferences, utility maximisation implies that agent i
consumes a positive quantity of the secondary good if and only if the following condition is satisfied
w + ✓irK¯
p1
> c¯1 (1)
Since an agent’s income is strictly increasing in the value of his ownership share ✓i, it follows that
any equilibrium must have a threshold structure: i.e only agents with an ownership share greater
than some (endogenous) threshold ✓i > ✓ˆ 2 [0, 1] will consume a positive quantity of the secondary
good. From the above condition, we can derive an expression for the threshold ownership share as
follows
✓ˆ =
p1c¯1   w
rK¯
(2)
We denote by iˆ 2 [0, 1] the marginal agent such that ✓iˆ = ✓ˆ.
Profit Maximisation The objective function of a (representative) firm in sector s 2 {1, 2} is
given by
max
Ks,Ls
⇧s = psYs(Ks, Ls)  wLs   rKs
Given the production technologies outlined above, profit maximisation in the secondary good sector
implies that the equilibrium interest rate must satisfy
r(K2, L2) =
@Y2
@K2
= ↵A
✓
L2
K2
◆1 ↵
(3)
while the equilibrium wage rate will be such that
w(K2, L2) =
@Y2
@L2
= (1  ↵)A
✓
K2
L2
◆↵
(4)
In what follows, it will be useful to have an expression for the wage-interest rate ratio, given by
⇢(K2;↵) ⌘ w
r
=
1  ↵
↵
K2 (5)
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Importantly, notice that this ratio is strictly increasing in K2. Finally, free-entry in the basic good
sector pins down the price of the basic good as a function of the interest rate
p1(r;A) =
r
A
(6)
Definition 1: A Walrasian equilibrium consists of relative prices (r⇤, w⇤, p⇤1, p⇤2) and quantities
(c⇤1, c⇤2,K⇤1 ,K⇤2 , L⇤2) such that
• All agents i 2 N choose consumption bundles (ci,1, ci,2) in order to maximise their utility
subject to their budget constraints, taking prices as given.
• Firms in both sectors s 2 {1, 2} choose factor inputs (K1,K2, L2) in order to maximise their
profits, taking prices as given.
• Labour, capital and goods markets clear.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
In what follows, we restrict attention to interior equilibria such that ✓ˆ 2 (0, 1). This requires us
to impose some parametric restrictions so that agents are neither too rich (so that not all agents
consume both goods) nor too poor (so that some agent consumes both goods). Formally, the
condition guaranteeing that the equilibrium is interior is given by
w + ✓0rK¯
p1
< c¯1 <
w + ✓1rK¯
p1
Using the price equations (3)-(6) derived above, and recalling that ✓i = q(i), we are led to the
following assumption.
Assumption 2: The distribution of ownership shares is such that
(1  ↵(1  q(0)))AK¯ < c¯1 < q(1)AK¯
Market clearing in the basic good sector implies
Z iˆ
0
✓
w + q(i)rK¯
p1
◆
di+ (1  iˆ)c¯1 = AK1 (7)
where iˆ 2 (0, 1) denotes the measure of constrained agents: i.e agents too poor to demand a positive
quantity of the secondary good. Recall from condition (1) that constrained agents will spend all
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their income on the basic good, while unconstrained agents will demand a constant quantity of
the basic good equal to c¯1. Using the free-entry condition p1 = r/A and the feasibility constraint
K1 +K2 = K¯, the market clearing condition simplifies to
A
⇣
iˆ⇢(K2) +Q(ˆi)K¯
⌘
+ (1  iˆ)c¯1 = A(K¯  K2) (8)
where ⇢(K2) > 0 denotes the wage-interest rate ratio. Finally, using the price equations (3)-(6)
and the fact that ✓ˆ = q(ˆi), we can rewrite the threshold condition (2) as follows
q(ˆi) =
c¯1
AK¯
  ⇢(K2)
K¯
(9)
These last two conditions define a system of two non-linear equations in two unknowns: the measure
of constrained agents iˆ 2 (0, 1) and the capital supplied to the secondary good sector K2 2 R++.
Its solution fully characterises the equilibrium prices and quantities for this economy.
Proposition 1: If Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied, there exists a unique interior Walrasian
equilibrium.
Proof : See Appendix B.
4.1 Capital Reallocation E↵ect
Building on this existence result, we are particularly interested in understanding how equilibrium
prices and quantities - especially the equilibrium allocation of capital across sectors - varies as a
function of the productivity parameter A. This leads us to the following comparative static result.
Corollary 1: Following a positive/negative Hicks-neutral productivity shock, capital is reallo-
cated from the basic/secondary good sector to the secondary/basic good sector.
Proof : See Appendix B.
What is the mechanism driving the reallocation of capital across sectors? For illustrative pur-
poses, consider the case of a negative Hicks-neutral shock. The productivity shock obviously has
as an immediate consequence a reduction of income for all agents. However, the non-homothetic
preferences of consumers results in this productivity shock also engendering a recomposition of
demand away from secondary goods and towards basic goods. In other words, a greater share of
aggregate income is now spent on the basic good. Because of this demand composition e↵ect, a
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greater share of capital (which is in fixed supply) is reallocated from the luxury goods sector to
the basic goods sector.
Since capital and labour are complements in production of the luxury good, the reallocation
of capital has as a consequence a lowering of the marginal product of labour in the luxury goods
sector. As labour is inelastically supplied, this results in a lowering of the wage rate, and thereby a
further decrease in the income of workers over and above the magnitude of the initial productivity
shock. Below, we study these e↵ects on factor prices in more detail.
4.2 Factor Prices
Given this capital reallocation e↵ect following a Hicks-neutral productivity shock, we now investi-
gate the e↵ects on the wage and interest rate. Di↵erentiating the wage condition (4) yields
dw⇤
dA
= (1  ↵)K⇤2↵| {z }+↵(1  ↵)AK⇤2↵ 1 dK⇤2dA| {z } > 0
direct e↵ect reallocation e↵ect
The first term of this derivative corresponds to the direct e↵ect of a productivity shock on the
marginal product of labour, for a given supply of capital to the secondary good sector. The second
term corresponds to the indirect e↵ect of a productivity shock on the marginal product of labour
engendered by the reallocation of capital to or from the secondary good sector (recall that capital
and labour are complements in production). Turning now to the interest rate, by di↵erentiating
condition (3) we obtain
dr⇤
dA
= ↵K⇤2
↵ 1| {z } ↵(1  ↵)AK⇤2↵ 1
dK⇤2
dA
K⇤2| {z } 7 0
direct e↵ect scarcity e↵ect
The change in the interest rate following a Hick-neutral productivity shock again consists of a di-
rect (productivity) component and an indirect (reallocation) component. Why is the interest rate,
contrary to the wage rate, not always increasing in A? The reason lies in the fact that even though
capital becomes more/less productive following a positive/negative productivity shock, it also be-
comes relatively less/more scarce (i.e the demand for the capital-intensive good increases/decreases
in relative terms). This (negative) scarcity e↵ect counterbalances the (positive) productivity e↵ect.
It can be shown that for su ciently small values of K¯, the scarcity e↵ect can in fact dominate the
productivity e↵ect, so that the interest rate will be decreasing in A. However, regardless of whether
the interest rate increases or decreases, the wage-interest rate ratio will always be increasing in the
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productivity parameter A. This is the factor demand e↵ect. Formally, we have
d⇢(K2)
dA
= ⇢0(K2)
dK2
dA
> 0
where, using the factor price equations (3)-(4), we have
⇢0(K2) =
1  ↵
↵
> 0
4.3 Income Distribution
We now turn to the task of examining how the distribution of income changes following a Hicks-
neutral shock to aggregate productivity. To this end, we begin by deriving the equilibrium distri-
bution of income. Using the budget constraint of agents, it follows that individual income is given
by
yi ⌘ Ii = w⇤ + ✓ir⇤K¯
Recall that since ✓i ⇠ G(✓), we must have
yi ⇠ H(y) ⌘ G
✓
y   w⇤
r⇤K¯
◆
where y 2 [yl, yh] with yl = w⇤ and yh = w⇤ + r⇤K¯. We use the Gini coe cient to measure the
degree of income inequality.
Definition 2: Given a piecewise di↵erentiable distribution function H(y) : [yl, yh] ! [0, 1] with
associated density function h(y) : [yl, yh]! [0, 1], the Gini coe cient   is defined as
  =
R yh
yl
H(y)(1 H(y))dyR yh
yl
yh(y)dy
Using this definition, we are lead to the following result.
Proposition 2: If Assumption 1 is satisfied, the Gini coe cient is decreasing in the productivity
parameter A.
Proof : See Appendix B.
In this frictionless environment, the counter-cyclicality of the Gini coe cient is a direct conse-
quence of changes in the wage-interest rate ratio. Note that because the Gini coe cient is scale
16
invariant, changes in the wage and interest rate pari passu do not a↵ect the degree of income
inequality since scaling or multiplying all incomes by the same factor does not change the value
of the Gini coe cient. However, since the wage-interest rate ratio is increasing in A, the factor
by which an agent’s income changes following a productivity shock is decreasing in the level of his
ex ante wealth. This can be seen formally by noticing that the relative change in agents’ income
after a shock varies as a function of agents’ capital ownership position
d⇢(K)
dA
> 0 ) d
d✓i
 
yi +
dyi
dA
yi
!
< 0
Alternatively, a simple way to interpret the cyclical dynamics of the income distribution is to
notice that labour income is uniformly distributed across the population, while capital income is
not. Therefore, whenever the wage increases/decreases relatively more than than the interest rate,
the share of aggregate income that is uniformly distributed increases/decreases relative to the share
that is unequally distributed.
5 Labour Market Frictions
As pointed out in the introduction, a large part of the variation in income inequality over the
business cycle appears to be due to changes in labour income, and more specifically variation
in the level of employment rate. Unfortunately, the Walrasian economy analysed above cannot
account for changes in the level of employment. In particular, demand composition e↵ects had no
implications for aggregate output because factors of production were always used to full capacity.
Although productivity shocks induced changes in relative prices, there was no variation along the
extensive margin. To address this shortcoming, we extend the model to account for labour market
frictions so that some agents remain unemployed in equilibrium. When frictions are introduced,
changes in the composition of demand (insofar as they change the matching rate on the labour
market) directly a↵ect the level of employment, and thus the level of aggregate output.
5.1 Labour Market
We model frictions as in the competitive search literature pioneered by Moen (1997). In a com-
petitive search equilibrium, firms post wage o↵ers. Workers observe all wage o↵ers and apply to
at most one job vacancy. Firms that receive at least one application hire one worker, pay the
announced wage, and produce. Workers who are not hired remain unemployed, while unfilled jobs
remain vacant. In this section, we solve for the (partial) equilibrium in the labour market, treating
the matching frictions as an exogenous technological constraint. Interested readers are referred to
Appendix A in which the micro-foundations of the matching frictions are derived in full.
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Environment Contrary to the Walrasian economy studied above, the secondary good is no
longer produced by a representative firm using a Cobb-Douglas production technology. Instead, we
assume the secondary good sector to consist of a continuum of homogeneous firms, each employing
at most one worker. Let F ⇢ R+ denote the set of active firms in the secondary goods sector,
and denote its Lebesgue measure by F 2 R+. Each firm needs at least  > 0 units of capital to
produce, which it rents on a competitive credit market at the interest rate r > 0. For simplicity,
we normalise  = 1. Production takes place using a constant returns-to-scale technology: i.e we
assume each firm employing a worker produces A > 0 unit of the secondary good. Aggregate
capital demanded by the secondary goods sector is thus given by
K2 =
Z F
0
dj = F (10)
Matching frictions imply that not every active firm succeeds in hiring a worker, and hence not every
active firm produces output in equilibrium. We assume the probability that firm j successfully
hires a worker to be given by6
µ(F) = (1  e  1F ) (11)
Note that this probability is strictly decreasing in the measure of firms active in the secondary
goods sector. Each firm posts a wage wj   0 in order to maximise its expected profits. Since firms
are homogeneous, we will have wj = w in equilibrium. The expected profits of firms is given by
E[⇡] = µ(F)(A  w)  r (12)
Free-entry of firms into the secondary good sector implies that expected profits must be equal to
zero in equilibrium.
Partial Equilibrium We show in Appendix A that the equilibrium wage posted by firms is
equal to
w(F ;A) = AF(e 1F   1) (13)
The free-entry condition pins downs the equilibrium measure of active firms as a function of the
interest rate. Substituting the equilibrium wage into the objective function of firms (12) and
solving for r yields an implicit condition pinning down the capital demanded by the secondary
good sector. Formally, we obtain
A
✓
1 
✓
1 +
1
F(r;A)
◆
e 
1
F(r;A)
◆
= r (14)
6See Appendix A for a detailed explanation of how this matching function is derived.
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We refer interested readers to Lemma A1 in Appendix A for a formal proof of the existence
and uniqueness of the partial equilibrium in the labour market. The level of employment in this
economy is equal to the measure of active firms successfully hiring a worker. This is given by
L2(F) = µ(F)F (15)
This leads us to the following result.
Lemma 1: The level of employment is strictly increasing in the quantity of capital allocated to
the secondary good sector.
Proof : See Appendix B.
5.2 Equilibrium
In this section, we return to the general equilibrium model and introduce the matching frictions
outlined above. Contrary to the Walrasian economy, agents now di↵er both in terms of their
initial ownership of the aggregate capital stock and their employment status (i.e whether they are
employed or unemployed). Importantly, an individual agents’ employment status is independent
of his capital ownership position. Given this, the market clearing condition (7) in the basic good
sector becomes
(1  L2)
 Z iˆU
0
q(i)rK¯
p1
di+ (1  iˆU )c¯1
!
+ L2
 Z iˆE
0
✓
w + q(i)rK¯
p1
◆
di+ (1  iˆE)c¯1
!
= AK1
where L2 denotes the employment rate as defined by condition (15), iˆU 2 (0, 1) denotes the
marginal unemployed agent, and iˆE 2 [0, 1) denotes the marginal employed agent. Note that, as
before, we restrict attention to interior equilibria, implying that some (but not all) unemployed
agents consume a positive quantity of the secondary good. Since unemployed agents receive no
wage income, Assumption 2 simplifies to the following condition.
Assumption 3: The distribution of ownership shares is such that
q(0)AK¯ < c¯1 < q(1)AK¯
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Using the threshold condition (2), we can derive explicit expressions for the marginal unemployed
and employed agent. Formally, these threshold conditions are given by
iˆU = q 1
⇣ c¯1
AK¯
⌘
and iˆE = max
⇢
0, q 1
✓
c¯1
AK¯
  ⇢(K2)
K¯
◆ 
Notice that the condition pinning down the measure of constrained unemployed agents does not
depend on the allocation of capital across sectors. Hence, even though the measure of unemployed
agents varies as a function of the quantity of capital allocated to the secondary good sector, the
quantity of basic good demanded by each unemployed agent will be constant. Intuitively, this is
because unemployed agents by definition do not earn a wage, and their income is thus una↵ected
by changes in the wage-interest rate ratio.
Using the free-entry condition p1 = r/A and the feasibility condition K1 + K2 = K¯, we can
rewrite the market clearing condition as follows
A(K¯  K2) = (1  L2)
⇣
(1  iˆU )c¯1 +Q(ˆiU )AK¯
⌘
+ L2
⇣
(1  iˆE)c¯1 +Q(ˆiE)AK¯ + iˆEA⇢(K2)
⌘
As before, these conditions constitute a system of two non-linear equations in two unknowns: the
capital supplied to the secondary good sector K2 2 R++ and the measure of constrained employed
agents iˆE 2 (0, 1). This leads us to the following existence result.
Proposition 3: If Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied, there exists a unique interior competitive
equilibrium in the model with frictions.
Proof : See Appendix B.
Given this, we now show that the capital reallocation e↵ect remains when frictions are intro-
duced. Moreover, from Lemma 1, this implies that the level of employment varies as a function of
aggregate productivity.
Corollary 2: Following a positive/negative Hicks-neutral productivity shock, capital is reallo-
cated from the basic/secondary good sector to the secondary/basic good sector. Moreover, the
level of employment is increasing in the productivity parameter A.
Proof : See Appendix B.
Broadly speaking, this result stems from the fact that productivity shocks, insofar as they change
the composition of demand due to the non-homotheticity of consumer preferences, change the
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measure of firms active in the secondary good sector. As total employment is proportional to the
measure of active firms in the secondary good sector, productivity shocks will directly a↵ect the
level of equilibrium employment. Contrary to the Walrasian case in which productivity shocks only
a↵ected relative prices, the model with frictions is also able to capture variation along the extensive
margin. This, in turn, implies that changes in the distribution of income will now be determined
both by changes in the wage-interest rate ratio and by changes in the level of employment.
5.3 Income Distribution
Deriving the income distribution in the model with frictions is somewhat more involved than in
the Walrasian case, since the set of agents is now partitioned into employed and unemployed
workers. However, the task is simplified by the fact that an individual agent’s employment status
is independent of his wealth. Partitioning agents based on their employment status, we have that
yEi = w
⇤ + ✓ir⇤K¯ and yUi = ✓ir
⇤K¯
where yEi and y
U
i denotes the income of employed and unemployed agents, respectively. Again,
since ✓i ⇠ G(✓) we have that
yEi ⇠ G
✓
yE   w
rK¯
◆
and yUi ⇠ G
✓
yU
rK¯
◆
where yE 2 [w⇤, w⇤ + r⇤K¯] and yU 2 [0, r⇤K¯]. It follows that the distribution of income is given
by the following piecewise continuous function
yi ⇠ H(y) ⌘ 1ywG
⇣ y
rK¯
⌘
(1  L2)+
1w<y<rK¯
✓
G
⇣ y
rK¯
⌘
(1  L2) +G
✓
y   w
rK¯
◆
L2
◆
+ 1y rK¯
✓
(1  L2) +G
✓
y   w
rK¯
◆
L2
◆
Although well defined, deriving an analytical expression for the Gini coe cient using this income
distribution function is quite tedious. Consequently, we turn to some simple numerical simulations
in order to analyse how the distribution of income is a↵ected by aggregate productivity shocks.
6 Numerical Simulations
This section is organised as follows. First, we parametrise the model with labour market frictions
in order to obtain an empirically relevant value for the level of income inequality. Using this
baseline parametrisation, we calculate the semi-elasticity of the Gini coe cient with respect to
productivity shocks of plausible magnitudes, and analyse the extent to which variations in the level
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of employment on the one hand, and changes in factor prices on the other, a↵ect income inequality
over the business cycle. We then study how modifying the model’s key parameters around this
calibrated benchmark a↵ect the cyclical properties of the income distribution. Inter alia, these
comparative statics allow us to examine the consequences of variations in the distribution of wealth.
Lastly, we obtain data from US over the period 1979-2005, and compare the semi-elasticity we
calculate using our parametrised model with that obtained from the data.
6.1 Baseline Parametrisation
The model has four free parameters: the degree of wealth inequality  , total factor productivity
A, the consumption satiation point c¯ and the aggregate capital stock K¯. To begin, we impose a
functional form for the distribution of wealth in the economy and assume the ownership shares
are Pareto distributed across the population. Formally, the cumulative distribution function of the
truncated Pareto distribution over the interval [l, 1] is given by:
✓i ⇠ Pa(✓; , l) = 1  l
 ✓  
1  l 
where l 2 (0, 1) denotes the lower bound of the distribution and   > 0 is the scaling parameter.
Together, these two parameters determine the degree of wealth inequality. We set these parameters
such that the Gini coe cient for wealth equals 0.73, the recorded value for the US in the late 2000s
(Piketty, 2013). We do this by fixing the value of  , and numerically solving for the value of the
lower bound of the distribution such that the Gini coe cient for wealth takes on the desired value.
The implied value is l = 0.001 when   = 0.01.
Target Variable Model US Data Parameter Value
Wealth Gini 0.72 0.73 ( , l¯) = (0.01, 0.001)
Income Gini 0.35 0.35 c¯ = 6
Employment-to-Population Ratio 0.68 0.71 K¯ = 5
Productivity - - A = 1
Table 4: Baseline Parametrisation.
We normalise the technology parameter A = 1 so that productivity shocks can be easily ex-
pressed in terms of percent deviations from the benchmark value. The consumption satiation point
c¯ and the capital stock K¯ are then chosen in order to simultaneously match the observed degree of
income inequality in the US and to obtain a plausible value for the level of equilibrium employment.
We use the Gini coe cient for income before taxes and transfers reported by the BEA for the US
in 2004, with a value of 0.35. The benchmark model then sets values of c¯ and K¯ equal to 6 and 5,
respectively. This parametrisation implies an employment-to-population ratio equal to 0.68, which
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while below is close to the value of 0.71 for the US in 2004 reported by the OECD. The baseline
parametrisation and the associated targeted values are summarised in Table 4.
0.965
0.97
0.975
0.98
0.985
0.99
0.995
1
1.005
1.01
1.015
0.347
0.348
0.349
0.35
0.351
0.352
0.353
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
SimulatedGiniCoefficientforIncome(LeftAxis) DeͲtrendedTFPGrowth(RightAxis)
Figure 3: Simulated Gini Coe cient for Income.
6.2 Simulation and Decomposition
Using this baseline model, we simulate the cyclical behaviour of the income distribution. We do
so by measuring the contemporaneous response of the simulated Gini coe cient for income to
shocks to the productivity parameter A. We parametrise the magnitude of these shocks in order to
match the observed pattern of de-trended total factor productivity growth in the US between 1979
and 2004, data we obtain from the San Francisco Federal Reserve. The output of this simulation
exercise is represented graphically in Figure 3. As can be easily seen, the Gini coe cient for
income remains counter-cyclical in the model with labour market frictions. This should not come
as a surprise, given that the employment rate is itself pro-cyclical. In terms of magnitude, the
model predicts that a shock that increases (decreases) TFP by 1% is associated with a rise (fall)
in the Gini coe cient of 0.001 units. This elasticity is also found to be linear, with a 2% shock
associated with a rise (fall) in the Gini of 0.002 units and a 5% shock associated with a rise (fall)
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in the Gini of 0.005 units.
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Figure 4: Decomposition of Simulated Gini Coe cient.
More interestingly, we can now examine how changes in the level of employment on the one hand,
and changes in factor prices on the other, contribute to the counter-cyclical movement of income
inequality. We do this by calculating the Gini coe cient anew using the simulated equilibrium
values, but fixing the employment rate at its benchmark value. As a result, movements in the Gini
coe cient will only reflect changes in the wage-interest rate ratio. Again, we present the results
graphically in Figure 4. This second simulation exercise clearly shows that variations in the level of
employment is the key channel explaining the counter-cyclicality of the Gini coe cient: given the
baseline parametrisation, the model suggests that only 34% of the variation in the Gini coe cient
is caused by changes in relative prices, implying that the remaining 66% results from changes in
the employment rate. Consistent with the empirical literature discussed above, this implies that
relative price changes, in and of themselves, explain only a limited fraction of the counter-cyclical
movements of income inequality.
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6.3 Comparative Statics
Turning now to the comparative statics, this section examines how the simulated economy reacts
to changes in the model’s key parameters. In particular, we are interested in understanding how
both the level of income inequality and the semi-elasticity of the Gini coe cient for income are
a↵ected by changes in the size of the aggregate capital stock, the consumption satiation point, and
the degree of wealth inequality.
K¯ Gini Coe cient (c¯ = 6) L⇤ c¯ Gini Coe cient (K¯ = 5) L⇤
5.0 0.35 0.68 6 0.35 0.68
4.5 0.37 0.65 8 0.39 0.64
4.0 0.40 0.61 10 0.42 0.61
3.5 0.43 0.57 12 0.46 0.57
3.0 0.47 0.52 14 0.50 0.53
Table 5: Income Inequality: Comparative statics for (K¯,c¯) around benchmark parametrisation.
Changes to the aggregate capital stock K¯ and the consumption satiation point c¯ have opposite,
but otherwise similar e↵ects on both the level of income inequality and its cyclical properties. For
example, a lower aggregate capital stock for a given satiation point, or a higher satiation point
for a given size of the capital stock, leads to higher level of income inequality. This is because
such changes lead to a sizeable decrease in the employment rate as less capital is supplied to the
labour-intensive sector. Table 5 summarises the degree of income inequality for di↵erent values
of the two parameters, and the associated equilibrium employment rate. We also find that at
higher levels of income inequality, the Gini coe cient for income is more sensitive to productivity
shocks. Again, this is because for a productivity shock of a given magnitude, the degree of capital
reallocation across sectors will be increasing in the level of inequality. Table 6 reports the calculated
semi-elasticity of the Gini coe cient for the same values of K¯ and c¯ as above.
K¯ Semi-Elasticity (c¯ = 6) c¯ Semi-Elasticity (K¯ = 5)
5.0 0.0011 6 0.0010
4.5 0.0011 8 0.0014
4.0 0.0013 10 0.0018
3.5 0.0015 12 0.0023
3.0 0.0018 14 0.0029
Table 6: Semi-Elasticity: Comparative statics for (K¯,c¯) around benchmark parametrisation
The above results show, quite intuitively, that the degree to which income inequality reacts
to business cycle shocks will be greater in economies with a lower rate of employment. More
generally, they indicate that the magnitude of the cyclical movements of the income distribution
are essentially determined by the level of income inequality, insofar as it determines the degree of
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demand recomposition over the business cycle. But how is the level of income inequality and its
cyclical properties a↵ected by the concentration of wealth? To answer this question, we examine
the e↵ect of changes in the value of l, the parameter that measures the lower bound on the
distribution of capital ownership. The results reported Table 7 clearly indicate that both the
degree of income inequality and its cyclicality are largely una↵ected by changes in the distribution
of capital ownership. Interestingly, this mirrors closely the results of Castaneda et al (1998), who
also find that the cyclical properties of the income distribution are essentially independent of the
wealth distribution. It also supports the claim that the brunt of the movement in income inequality
over the business cycle is caused by changes in the employment rate, and to a lesser degree changes
in relative prices, and that changes in the degree of wealth inequality in and of themselves have
very little e↵ect.
l Gini Income Semi-Elasticity Gini Wealth
0.001 0.35 0.0011 0.72
0.005 0.36 0.0013 0.62
0.010 0.36 0.0014 0.58
0.015 0.36 0.0014 0.55
0.20 0.36 0.0014 0.53
Table 7: Semi-Elasticity: Comparative statics for l around benchmark parametrisation.
In addition to having no sizeable e↵ect on the cyclical properties of the income distribution, the
level of income inequality also appears to be largely independent of the concentration of wealth.
Standard general equilibrium e↵ects are the cause of this seemingly paradoxical result. As an
illustration, consider what would happen following an exogenous redistributive shock that leads to
a reduction in the degree of wealth inequality. As the revenue accruing to owners of the capital
stock will now be more equitably distributed, the direct e↵ect of this redistribution will be a
reduction in inequality. However, the implied income e↵ects will also engender a recomposition of
aggregate demand away from secondary (labour-intensive) goods towards basic (capital-intensive)
goods. This translates into a greater share of aggregate income accruing to capital as it becomes
the relatively more scare factor of production. In equilibrium, these two e↵ects almost perfectly
cancel each other out: the decrease in inequality caused by the initial redistribution is neutralised
by a fall in the wage-interest rate ratio and employment rate, which itself leads to an increase in
the returns to capital compared to labour.
6.4 Empirical versus Simulated Semi-Elasticities
We conclude this section by comparing the simulated semi-elasticity we obtain using our baseline
parametrisation with the empirical semi-elasticity calculated using US data from 1979 to 1999.
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To do so, we gathered annual data on the Gini coe cient for income before taxes and transfers
from the BEA. De-trending this series, we isolated the cyclical component of income inequality as
measured by the Gini coe cient. We then calculated the simulated cyclical component of the Gini
coe cient using the same data on de-trended total factor productivity growth described above.
Figure 5 plots these two series and calculates their correlation.
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Figure 5: Cyclical Component of Gini Coe cient and De-trended TFP Growth, US 1979-2005.
Source: BEA and San Francisco Federal Reserve
In order to obtain an estimate for the semi-elasticity of the Gini coe cient for income, we simply
regress the cyclical component of the Gini coe cient on de-trended total factor productivity growth.
We adopt two specifications, one in which we use the contemporaneous value of TFP growth and
one in which TFP growth enters the regression with a one year lag. Since the data is de-trended,
we do not include a coe cient in the regression model. The results of these two regressions are
reported in Table 8 below.
Variable Coe cient Coe cient
(Std. Err) (Std. Err.)
TFPt -0.0031 -
(0.0023)
TFPt 1 -  0.0038⇤
(0.0019)
Table 8: Estimated Semi-Elasticity of Gini Coe cient for Income, US 1979-2005.
As can be seen from the table, the estimated semi-elasticity of the Gini coe cient lies in
the range -0.003 to -0.004. While we do not wish to place excessive weight on the precision of
these estimates, we do believe they give us a good indication of order of magnitude. Using the
baseline parametrisation, the simulated model thus seems to explain 25-30% of the change in
27
income inequality. If we deviate from the baseline parametrisation and increase the value of the
consumption satiation point, then the simulated model can capture up to 75% of the estimated
e↵ect. However, as mentioned above, such a specification implies unrealistically low levels of income
inequality and employment. Several omissions from the model, that we leave for further research at
this stage, can explain this discrepancy. One of the most glaring and obvious is the model’s failure
to account for movements in the wage distribution among employed workers. In our framework,
employment probabilities and wages do not depend on the position of the agent in the distribution.
Still, several empirical studies have shown that although unemployment and household earnings
are pro-cyclical along the whole income distribution, business cycle fluctuations are more severe at
the bottom of the distribution. Extending the model along these lines seems necessary in order to
better capture the magnitude of changes in income inequality over the business cycle.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a new theory explaining the counter-cyclical property of the income distri-
bution. After motivating empirically the extent of demand recomposition over the business cycle,
we developed a model to study how such demand composition e↵ects a↵ect the distribution of
income in the short run. To this end, we designed a two-sector general equilibrium model with
labour market frictions in which (i) the ownership of capital is unequally distributed among the
population, (ii) consumers have non-homothetic preferences and (iii) sectors di↵er in terms of their
relative labour- and capital-intensity. Using this framework, we first show that changes in the
composition of demand are an important channel through which productivity shocks are propa-
gated through the economy. Second, and more importantly, we cast a new light on the specific
channels driving short-run changes in the distribution of income. Income inequality (as measured
by the Gini coe cient) is found to be counter-cyclical, and this e↵ect is driven by changes in
the level of employment, and to a lesser degree by changes in relative factor prices. Interestingly,
these theoretical results go a long way in rationalising the results of recent empirical studies which
found that inequality rises during recessions because increases in unemployment and lower wages
worsen the relative position of low-income groups. Finally, we find that the dynamics of the income
distribution are essentially independent from the concentration of wealth, a puzzle highlighted in
Castaneda et al (1998) but which had yet to receive a clear theoretical justification
More generally, we believe this paper calls for additional research on the short-run consequences
of changes in the composition of aggregate demand. To date, most studies have examined variations
in spending over the business cycle using characteristics of the products, such as their tradability
or durability. However, as stated above, sorting goods and services by factor-intensity of inputs
(rather than end-use) suggests that there are significant di↵erences in the way sectors respond to
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business cycle shocks, with important consequences for factor prices and income dispersion. Inter
alia, explicitly modelling such demand composition e↵ects might help in addressing some of the
shortcomings of heterogeneous agent models. As pointed out by Oh (2013), standard business
cycle models with only shocks to total factor productivity (TFP) fail to explain the cyclicality of
inequality, which in turn precludes a careful examination of the welfare costs of business cycles.
Introducing and exploring in more detail the consequences of these largely-ignored aspects of
economic fluctuations constitutes an important avenue for further research.
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8 Appendix A: Competitive Search Equilibrium
This section provides formal derivations of the partial equilibrium in the labour market.
Environment Firms post wage announcements wj   0. After having observed the distribution
of wage announcements, each worker chooses a (symmetric) application strategy, denoted by  j 2
[0, 1] for all j 2 F such that R F0  jdj = 1. The workers’ application strategies induce an expected
queue length at each firm, denoted by  j   0. This corresponds to the expected number of
job applicants at a firm posting wage wj . Given the assumption that application strategies are
symmetric and independent across workers, the actual number of applicants at a firm posting wage
wj is a Poisson random variable with mean  j . Each firm posting wage wj receives z 2 {0, 1, 2, ...}
applicants with probability
 zj e
  j
z! . It follows that the probability that a worker applying to a firm
posting a wage wj is hired is equal to
⌫( j) = lim
z¯!1
z¯X
z=0
1
(z + 1)
 zje
  j
z!
=
1  e  j
 j
It follows that we must have
µ( j) ⌘  jv( j) = (1  e  j )
The queue lengths are determined such that each worker obtains an expected utility of at least
V > 0 from applying to any active firm. Since a worker facing a queue of length  j is hired with
probability ⌫( j), this implies the following indi↵erence condition must hold in equilibrium
⌫( j)wj = V
Labour market clearing requires that the total number of workers searching for a job must equal
the aggregate labour supply. Formally, this impliesZ F
0
 jdj = 1
Definition A1: A competitive search equilibrium is defined as a tuple hw, , V,Fi such that
• Firms choose wages w to maximize expected profits, taking as given workers’ expected utility
V and queue lengths  .
• Each worker applies to exactly one firm thereby inducing queue lengths  , taking the profile
of wages w as given.
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• Queue lengths   and the measure of firms entering the market F are such that the labour
market clears.
Equilibrium We now solve for the partial equilibrium in the labour market, taking the interest
rate r > 0 as exogenous. Begin by substituting the indi↵erence condition into the objective function
of firms as given by condition (12)
E[⇡j ] = A(1  e  j )   jV   r
Di↵erentiating this equation with respect to  j yields the first-order condition
 j = log
✓
A
V
◆
, 8j 2 F
Since the RHS of this condition does not depend on j, it must be that the equilibrium queue
lengths (and thus the equilibrium wage announcements) are the same for all active firms. Given
this, the labour market clearing condition implies
 (F) = 1F
Combining the last two equations allows us to solve for the equilibrium expected utility of workers
V (F ;A) = Ae  1F
Plugging this condition into the indi↵erence condition of workers, we can solve for the wage posted
by firms in equilibrium
w(F ;A) = AF(e 1F   1)
Substituting this into the expected profit condition (12) and simplifying, we obtain
E[⇡] = A
✓
1 
✓
1 +
1
F
◆
e 
1
F
◆
  r
Free-entry of firms into the secondary good sector implies expected profits are equal to zero in
equilibrium. This pins down the equilibrium measure of active firms as a function of the interest
rate. Setting the last condition equal to zero and solving for r yields
r = A
✓
1 
✓
1 +
1
F(r;A)
◆
e 
1
F(r;A)
◆
This leads us to the following existence result.
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Lemma A1: Given any interest rate r 2 (0, A], there exists a unique competitive search equi-
librium. Moreover, the equilibrium measure of active firms F⇤ is decreasing in r and increasing in A.
Proof : Begin by noticing that expected gross revenue of a firm is a continuous and monotonically
decreasing function of the measure of active firms, beginning at A when F = 0 and converging to
0 as F !1. Formally,
d
dF
✓
A
✓
1 
✓
1 +
1
F
◆
e 
1
F
◆◆
=  e
  1F
F3 < 0
It follows that given any (exogenous) interest rate r 2 (0, A], there exists a unique and finite
equilibrium measure of active firms F⇤(r;A). ⇤
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9 Appendix B: Proofs
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Recall that the LHS of condition (8) corresponds to the aggregate demand for the basic good,
while the RHS equals the aggregate supply of the basic good. It is easy to verify that the RHS is
monotonically decreasing in K2 from [AK¯, 0] on the interval K2 2 [0, K¯]. Di↵erentiating the LHS
with respect to K2, we obtain
diˆ
dK2
⇣
A
⇣
⇢(K2) + q(ˆi)K¯
⌘
  c¯1
⌘
| {z }+A
✓
1  ↵
↵
◆
iˆ > 0
= 0
where the inequality follows from Assumption 2, since it implies that iˆ 2 (0, 1) is such that
w + q(ˆi)rK¯
p1
= c¯1
It follows that aggregate demand for the basic good is monotonically increasing in K2. Evaluating
the LHS of the market clearing condition (8) at K2 = 0, we have that
Q(ˆi)AK¯ + (1  iˆ)c¯1 < AK¯
since ⇢(0) = 0. Rearranging, we obtain
(1 Q(ˆi))AK¯ > (1  iˆ)c¯1
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1 since Q(i) < i for all i 2 (0, 1), and Assumption
2 since AK¯ > c¯1. It follows that there exists a unique equilibrium. ⇤
9.2 Proof of Corollary 1.
Rewriting the market clearing condition (8) and di↵erentiating with respect to A yields
dK⇤2
dA
= (1  iˆ⇤) c¯1
A2
  iˆ⇤⇢0(K⇤2 )
dK⇤2
dA
+
diˆ⇤
dA
⇣ c¯1
A
  ⇢(K⇤2 )  q(ˆi⇤)K¯
⌘
| {z }
= 0
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Solving for dK⇤2/dA, we obtain
dK⇤2
dA
= !(ˆi⇤;↵)
c¯1
A2
> 0
where
!(ˆi;↵) =
↵(1  iˆ)
↵+ (1  ↵)ˆi 2 (0, 1)
This completes the proof. ⇤
9.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
We begin by rewriting the Gini coe cient in terms of the quantile function. Formally,
  = 1  2
Z 1
0
L(x)dx
where
L(x) =
R x
0 H
 1(p)dpR 1
0 H
 1(p)dp
is the Lorenz curve and H 1(p) = w⇤ +Q(p)r⇤K¯ is the income quantile function. It follows that
the Gini coe cient will be decreasing in A if and only if the Lorenz curve is increasing in A.
Formally,
d
dA
R x
0 w
⇤ +Q(p)r⇤K¯dpR 1
0 w
⇤ +Q(p)r⇤K¯dp
> 0
Multiplying and dividing by r, we have
d
dA
R x
0 ⇢
⇤(A) +Q(p)K¯dpR 1
0 ⇢
⇤(A) +Q(p)K¯dp
> 0
which implies✓Z x
0
d
dA
⇢⇤(A)dp
◆Z 1
0
H 1(p)dp 
✓Z 1
0
d
dA
⇢⇤(A)dp
◆Z x
0
H 1(p)dp > 0
Simplifying, we obtain ✓
x
Z 1
0
H 1(p)dp 
Z x
0
H 1(p)dp
◆
d
dA
⇢⇤(A) > 0
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From Assumption 1, we must have
x > L(x) =
R x
0 H
 1(p)dpR 1
0 H
 1(p)dp
Since ⇢⇤(A) is always increasing in A, this completes the proof. ⇤
9.4 Proof of Lemma 1.
The result is obtained by di↵erentiating the employment condition (15) with respect to the measure
of active firms F . It is easy to verify that dL2dF > 0. Since the capital demand condition (10) implies
that K2 = F , the result follows immediately. ⇤
9.5 Proof of Proposition 3.
Di↵erentiating the RHS of the marketed clearing condition with respect to K2 yields
dL2
dK2|{z}
 
DE1 (K2)  D¯U1
 
+ L2
0@ diˆE
dK2
⇣
A⇢(K2) + q(ˆi
E)AK¯   c¯1
⌘
| {z }+iˆEA ⇢0(K2)| {z }
1A
(+) = 0 (+)
where DE1 (K2) and D¯
U
1 denotes the quantity of basic good demanded by employed and unemployed
agents, respectively. Notice that, contrary to the Walrasian case, all employed agents can be
unconstrained in equilibrium. That is, we can have
w + q(ˆiE)rK¯
p1
> c¯1
implying that iˆE = 0. Notice that by definition in such a case we will have diˆE/dK2 = 0. Using
the capital demand, wage and free-entry conditions (10), (13)-(14) we have
⇢0(K2) = ⇢(K2)2
✓
2 
✓
1  1
K2
◆
e
1
K2  
✓
1 +
1
K2
+
1
K2
2
◆
e 
1
K2
◆
> 0
It follows that the aggregate demand of basic good will be monotonically increasing in F if and
only if employed agents demand strictly more basic good than unemployed agents. Formally,
DE1 (K2)  D¯U1 = (ˆiU   iˆE)c¯1 + iˆEA⇢(K2) Q(ˆiU   iˆE)AK¯ > 0
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Dividing by AK¯ and noticing that q(ˆiU ) = c¯1/AK¯, we obtain
(ˆiU   iˆE)q(ˆiU ) + iˆE ⇢(K2)
K¯
 Q(ˆiU   iˆE) > 0
where the inequality follows from Assumption 1 as long as iˆU 6= iˆE . From Assumption 3, we have
that iˆU > iˆE since iˆU > 0 and iˆE < 1. Evaluating aggregate demand for the basic good at K2 = 0,
and noticing that L2 = 0 when K2 = 0, we must have
Q(ˆiU )AK¯ + (1  iˆU )c¯1 < AK¯
Rearranging, we obtain
(1 Q(ˆiU ))AK¯ > (1  iˆU )c¯1
which is always the case as long as iˆU < 1 since Q(ˆiU ) < iˆU and AK¯ > c¯1 by assumption. Finally,
since aggregate supply of the basic good is monotonically decreasing in K2 starting at AK¯ when
K2 = 0, it follows that there exists a unique competitive equilibrium. ⇤
9.6 Proof of Corollary 2.
Rearranging the market clearing condition, we obtain
K⇤2 = K¯   (1  L2)
⇣
(1  iˆU ) c¯1
A
+Q(ˆiU )K¯
⌘
  L2
⇣
(1  iˆE⇤) c¯1
A
+Q(ˆiE⇤)K¯ + iˆE⇤⇢(K⇤2 )
⌘
Di↵erentiating this condition with respect to A yields
dK⇤2
dA
=
(1  L2)(1  iˆU )c¯1 + L2(1  iˆE⇤)c¯1
A2
 
(DE1 (K
⇤
2 )  D¯U2 )
@L2
@K2
dK⇤2
dA
  L2
 
iˆE⇤⇢0(K⇤2 )
dK⇤2
dA
+
diˆE⇤
dA
⇣
⇢(K⇤2 ) + q(ˆi
E⇤)K¯   c¯1
A
⌘
| {z }
!
= 0
where again we have that whenever iˆE = 0 we will have diˆE/dA = 0. Rearranging yields the
following comparative static condition
dK⇤2
dA
=
(1  L2)(1  iˆU )c¯1 + L2(1  iˆE⇤)c¯1
A2
✓
1 + iˆE⇤⇢0(K⇤2 )L2 + (D
E
1 (K
⇤
2 ) DU2 )
dL2
dK2
◆ 1
> 0
This completes the proof. ⇤
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10 Appendix C: Tables and Figures
Rank Industry Title Labor Share Capital Share
1 Educational services 91,8% 8,2%
2 Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities 91,5% 8,5%
3 Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 90,7% 9,3%
4 Computer systems design and related services 90,4% 9,6%
5 Management of companies and enterprises 90,0% 10,0%
6 Printing and related support activities 87,6% 12,4%
7 Social assistance 82,4% 17,6%
8 Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 81,6% 18,4%
9 Warehousing and storage 80,2% 19,8%
10 Air transportation 79,0% 21,0%
11 Other transportation equipment 78,0% 22,0%
12 Computer and electronic products 76,9% 23,1%
13 Administrative and support services 76,3% 23,7%
14 Wood products 75,7% 24,3%
15 Apparel and leather and allied products 75,3% 24,7%
16 Ambulatory health care services 75,3% 24,7%
17 Textile mills and textile product mills 75,0% 25,0%
18 Food services and drinking places 74,6% 25,4%
19 Furniture and related products 74,3% 25,7%
20 Retail trade 72,4% 27,6%
21 Primary metals 72,3% 27,7%
22 Machinery 71,7% 28,3%
23 Rail transportation 70,7% 29,3%
24 Other transportation and support activities 70,6% 29,4%
25 Fabricated metal products 70,1% 29,9%
26 Wholesale trade 69,0% 31,0%
27 Support activities for mining 68,8% 31,2%
28 Construction 67,7% 32,3%
29 Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries 67,7% 32,3%
30 Information and data processing services 67,3% 32,7%
31 Other services, except government 66,8% 33,2%
32 Accommodation 66,6% 33,4%
33 Nonmetallic mineral products 66,5% 33,5%
34 Truck transportation 64,3% 35,7%
35 Plastics and rubber products 64,1% 35,9%
36 Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 63,7% 36,3%
37 Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services 63,3% 36,7%
38 Transit and ground passenger transportation 62,7% 37,3%
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 61,7% 38,3%
40 Publishing industries (includes software) 61,2% 38,8%
41 Insurance carriers and related activities 60,2% 39,8%
42 Waste management and remediation services 59,9% 40,1%
43 Paper products 58,3% 41,7%
44 Legal services 57,4% 42,6%
45 Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and related activities 56,5% 43,5%
46 Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 55,7% 44,3%
47 Mining, except oil and gas 53,0% 47,0%
48 Water transportation 52,6% 47,4%
49 Food and beverage and tobacco products 51,8% 48,2%
50 Motion picture and sound recording industries 51,8% 48,2%
51 Forestry, fishing, and related activities 50,4% 49,6%
52 Pipeline transportation 47,6% 52,4%
53 Chemical products 45,9% 54,1%
54 Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and related activities 42,6% 57,4%
55 Broadcasting and telecommunications 40,5% 59,5%
56 Utilities 31,2% 68,8%
57 Oil and gas extraction 26,7% 73,3%
58 Petroleum and coal products 23,6% 76,4%
59 Farms 19,4% 80,6%
60 Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible assets 18,5% 81,5%
61 Real estate 5,6% 94,4%
Min 5,6% 8,2%
Max 91,8% 94,4%
Mean 63,4% 36,6%
Median 66,8% 33,2%
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